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Abstract 
Collaboration has been indispensable in resolving many contemporary problems involved 
in emergency/disaster management, but it is unclear if key determinants of collaboration 
established through studies focused on the Western world would apply to countries 
outside the West. The purpose of this cross-sectional non-experimental study was to 
examine the effects of political affiliation, an established determinant, on collaboration 
among emergency management agencies (EMAs) in Nigeria. Barnes’s theory of social 
network and Lévi-Strauss’s theory of social exchanges framed the study. Survey data 
were collected from a sample of 38 EMAs out of the population of 812 EMAs; they were 
affiliated with 6 political parties in control of different jurisdictions between 2011 and 
2015. Data were grouped into 2 categories based on the alignment of political affiliation 
of the agencies (same party vs. different parties). Data were analyzed using descriptive 
statistics and t-tests. Results suggested no significant difference in the perception of the 
strength of collaboration among the representatives of the EMAs who had similar 
political party alignment when compared with the perception of the strength of 
collaboration among EMAs who had different political party alignment (p = .15). 
Implications for positive social change include recommendations for government 
officials to focus on the other determinants of collaboration, that is, improving 
management techniques and making resources available regardless of political affiliation. 
These could ultimately contribute to making emergency management more effective and 
efficient, thereby reducing the adverse effects of emergencies and disasters on the 
citizenry.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The scope and intensity of natural and human-made disasters and emergencies are 
widening and becoming more intense (Bodeau, Fedorowicz, Markus, & Brooks, 2009). 
The attendant losses are equally becoming quite astronomical (Topper & Lagadec, 2013; 
Waugh, 2006). There is therefore an impetus to find ways to better manage these 
devastating events to minimize losses and the subsequent disruption to social functioning. 
Several studies aimed at understanding and improving emergency management have been 
conducted. One major finding from these studies is that collaboration among entities 
involved in emergency/disaster management is essential (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; 
Meunier, 2013; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Robinson & Gaddis, 2012; Waugh & Streib, 
2006). Studies have equally shown that collaboration is dependent on social structure 
(Mullin & Daley, 2009). The current study was aimed at exploring the effect(s) political 
affiliations (one of the indicators of social structure) have on collaboration among 
governmental organizations involved in managing emergencies in Nigeria. Given the 
pivotal role governmental organizations play in managing emergencies (Kapucu & 
Demiroz, 2011, McEntire, Fuller, Johnston, & Weber, 2002; McGuire, 2006), and the 
multiplier effects collaboration can bring to resolving social problems and challenges 
(Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; McGuire, 2006), an 
understanding of likely inhibitors or promoters of collaboration among these 
governmental agencies would no doubt help improve service delivery. This study 
attempted to show in what ways political affiliations inhibit or promote collaboration 
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among emergency management agencies. An understanding of these dynamics could help 
to draft policies and the necessary rules of engagement that would guide the 
indispensable interactions among the agencies. This could ultimately contribute to 
making emergency management more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the 
adverse effects of emergencies and disasters on the citizenry.  
Organization of Chapter 
Chapter 1 covers the introduction to the study and opens with a brief introductory 
statement describing the topic and the possible positive social change the study can bring 
about. This is followed by an elaboration of the organization of the chapter and the 
background to the study, which sets the stage by justifying the need for the study. 
Thereafter, the problem statement, purpose of the study, and research question and 
hypotheses are presented. These are then followed by the theoretical framework for the 
study, the nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, 
limitations, and significance of the study. The chapter is finally closed with a summary 
and transitional statements to Chapter 2.  
Background 
Collaboration is essential for resolving difficult, even intractable social problems 
(Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire, 2006). Natural and human-
made emergencies and disasters fall into this category of social problems (McGuire & 
Silvia, 2010). How collaboration works in or its impact on emergency management is yet 
to be fully understood (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2007). Based on the established 
precepts that social structure affects behavior (Barnes, 1954), earlier studies have 
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identified indicators of social structure as political context, financial capacity, and 
management techniques (Mullin & Daley, 2009). There have been calls for the 
exploration of how these indicators affect collaboration (Clay, 2012; Leslie, 2012; 
Wrobel, 2012). I followed these recommendations by exploring the impact of political 
context on collaboration among governmental organizations in an emergency 
management setting. This will promote a better understanding of the dynamics of 
collaboration among these agencies and encourage the enactment of policies and 
procedures that would maximize collaboration among the entities for the benefit of the 
populace.  
Problem Statement 
Studies have shown that most public policy problems require multilateral, 
multidisciplinary, and multiagency efforts to be resolved (Engstrand & Ahlander, 2008; 
Fierlbeck, 2010; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev, 2009; 
Mullin & Daley, 2009). Given its importance in facilitating the required multifaceted 
interactions in public administration, collaboration has been a focus of scientific inquiry 
in recent times. Several studies have examined the nature, extent, and effectiveness of 
collaboration among different types of entities engaged in emergency or disaster 
management (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Meunier, 2013; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Robinson 
& Gaddis, 2012; Waugh & Streib, 2006). The authors of these studies tended to conclude 
that collaboration is a sine qua non for emergency management.  
Studies also showed that such collaboration is dependent on several cultural and 
social factors (Barjak & Robinson, 2008; Chua, Morris, & Mor, 2012; Stahl, Maznevski, 
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Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010; Vangen & Winchester, 2013). However, most of these studies on 
collaboration focused on the Western world and particularly the United States of 
America. Given the cultural diversity among nations (Vangen & Winchester, 2013), it is 
not clear if the drivers of collaboration established by these studies would apply to 
countries outside the Western Hemisphere. This study was therefore aimed at testing one 
of the established models of the determinants of collaboration in emergency management 
on a country (Nigeria) outside the Western Hemisphere. The ultimate objective of the 
study was to identify strategies that would make emergency management more effective 
and efficient in the country while at the same time contributing to the knowledge about 
the dynamics of collaboration outside the Western world. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study was aimed at investigating if the assertion that politics often affect 
policies (Meier, 2000; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Wilson, 1989) 
held true in the realm of emergency management. The purpose of this quantitative study 
was therefore to examine the effects political affiliations have on collaboration among 
emergency management agencies in Nigeria. My objective as a researcher was to assess 
the influence of political preferences on collaborative behaviors among emergency 
management agencies in Nigeria. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
This quantitative study hinged on the assumption that collaboration would be 
stronger between same-party agencies than between different-parties agencies. The 
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research question and hypotheses used to explore the veracity of this assumption among 
emergency management agencies in Nigeria are presented below. 
Research Question: Does alignment of political affiliation affect collaboration 
among emergency management agencies? 
H0: Collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency 
management agencies differing in political affiliation and between agencies in the same 
political affiliation. 
Ha: The perceived collaboration strength is significantly higher for emergency 
management agencies of similar political affiliation than those with different affiliations.  
Theoretical Framework for the Study 
This study was framed within two related theoretical perspectives. The first was 
Barnes’s (1954) theory of social network, in which the behavior of an entity (an 
individual, a group, or an organization) is conditioned or influenced by the structure of 
social relationships around such an entity. For Barnes and Mullin and Daley (2009), 
structure is related to the way society is organized for decision making and 
administration. Further applications of Barnes’s theory in different fields of study have 
produced several refinements. Mullin and Daley identified three key drivers or indicators 
of social structure, namely political context, financial capacity, and management 
techniques. My research focused on how a particular behavior (interagency collaboration) 
is conditioned or influenced by one of the identified indicators of social structures 
(political context) in an emergency management setting. Political context refers to the 
underlying political dispensation of the environment within which the interaction is 
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taking place. The second guiding theoretical framework was Lévi-Strauss’s (1969) theory 
of social exchanges, in which the purpose of exchange in a social relationship is to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs. More details on the theories of social network and 
social exchange will be presented in Chapter 2. Mullin and Daley argued that similarity 
in political preferences among agencies encourages collaboration. Based on this 
theoretical framework, I hypothesized that collaboration would be significantly higher 
among emergency management agencies of jurisdictions under the control of same 
political party than among those under different political parties. 
Nature of the Study 
The study was carried out using quantitative research method with a cross-
sectional non-experimental design. The quantitative method was very suitable for a study 
such as this that would assess the influence of political preferences on collaborative 
behaviors among emergency management agencies. The dependent variable for the study 
was the strength of collaboration while the independent variable was political affiliations. 
Covariate variables considered were the agencies’ financial capacity and management 
techniques. The dependent variable was expressed as a quantitative measure in scores, 
while the independent variable (political affiliations) was dichotomous (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2013, p. 3) based on same party and different parties’ alignment. Detailed 
explanation of the nature of the variables will be presented in Chapter 2. Data were 
collected from heads of emergency management agencies at the federal and state 
government levels in Nigeria using a 7-point Likert scale survey instrument. The data 
generated was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
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Descriptive statistical analyses were carried out as appropriate to summarize the data. 
The significance of mean group differences in the perceived strength of collaboration 
(dependent variable) between the same-party and the different-parties groups 
(independent variable) was derived using independent sample t test to test the hypotheses 
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2013, p. 15).  
Definitions 
There were six important concepts that were of relevance to this study. These 
were emergency management, emergency management agency, collaboration, political 
affiliation, financial capacity, and management techniques. The adopted definitions of 
these concepts for this study are presented below:  
Collaboration: According to Thomson et al. (2007), collaboration  
is a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through 
formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing 
their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them 
together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial 
interactions. (p. 3) 
The aim of collaboration is to solve problems that a single entity cannot resolve on its 
own (Bingham, 2008, p. 250).  
Emergency management: Emergency management is the managerial function 
responsible for articulating and operationalizing policies and procedures aimed at 
reducing societal vulnerability to hazards, coping with emergencies/disasters when they 
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eventually occur, and returning society to normal or better functioning state (Blanchard et 
al., 2007).  
Emergency management agency: A governmental organization established either 
by legislation or by an executive order tasked with the responsibility of coordinating 
plans, actions, and resources towards the management of all forms of emergencies. The 
organization may be a unique entity with formalized structure or maybe a committee-
styled ensemble of nominated government officials.  
Financial capacity: Financial capacity is a measure of the ability of a system to 
meet its financial obligations. The International Risk Management Institute, Inc. (2016) 
defined financial capacity as “the financial limit of an organization's ability to absorb 
losses with its own funds or borrowed funds without major disruption” (para. 1).   
Management techniques: Management techniques are the systematic and 
analytical methods used by managers to assist in decision making and the improvement 
of efficiency and effectiveness. These techniques typically have applications in all 
aspects of planning, organizing, directing and controlling the activities of all types of 
organizations (Armstrong, 2006).  
Political affiliation: The adoption or close association of an entity to a political 
party based on congruency of ideology, policies, programs, or other interests.  
Assumptions 
The philosophical assumptions underpinning this quantitative research study with 
a cross-sectional non-experimental design were rooted in the postpositivist traditions. 
Ontologically (nature of reality) speaking, postpositivism adopts a critical realism 
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paradigm in which reality is viewed as imperfect and therefore only probabilistically 
apprehensible (Gelo, 2012). Epistemologically (nature of knowledge) speaking, the 
objectivist modified paradigm, in which knowledge is not absolutely but rather probably 
true, is adopted. These views allow for the “higher degree of indeterminacy” faced in 
scientific inquiries and “the emphasis placed on theory falsification instead of on theory 
verification promoted” by postpositivism (Gelo, 2012, p. 120). The postpositivist 
propositions also support the adoption of quantitative research methods with 
experimental, quasi-experimental, and correlational (non-experimental) designs as well as 
probabilistic and purposive (convenience) sampling techniques (Gelo, 2012). 
Consequent upon the foregoing, the most critical assumptions relating to the 
nature of reality and knowledge about the methodological approach to this study were as 
follows: 
• An organization’s political affiliation could be imputed from the political 
affiliation of the head of the organization.  
• All participants in the study would reflect the larger population of the heads of 
emergency management agencies in Nigeria. 
• Responses from the states would be representative of those of the local 
governments given that the political parties in control of the states also control 
the local governments within the states (explanation appears in the Procedures 
for Recruitment section of Chapter 3). 
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Scope and Delimitations 
Studies have shown that there are several phenomena that can affect collaborative 
behaviors (Mullin & Daley, 2009). This study was, however, restricted to exploring the 
effects that political affiliations have on collaborative behavior among emergency 
management agencies in Nigeria. Political affiliation was chosen from among the several 
drivers of social structure (Mullin & Daley, 2009) given the nascent nature of multiparty 
democracy in the country and the desire to comprehend how party politics impact social 
service delivery. Although several governmental organizations as well as private 
organizations and individuals are often involved in managing emergencies (Waugh & 
Streib, 2006), this study was restricted to considering political affiliations and 
collaboration among governmental organizations established either by legislation or 
executive order and mandated to manage emergencies and disasters within their 
respective jurisdictions (federal, state, and local government levels). The study was 
bounded within the broad network theory frameworks of social network and social 
exchange theories. The study did not extend to the consideration of network analysis. 
Social network analysis, which is typically used to explain the nature of relations in a 
network and how that might affect outcomes, is usually carried out by setting out patterns 
presented in graphs that depicts the social ties among actors (Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1994). The findings of the study have the potential to be generalizable to 
intergovernmental relations across disciplines. Also, because political power 
configuration in Nigeria changes every 4 years, the study focused on the 4-year period 
spanning May 2011 to May 2015.  
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Limitations 
One major limitation of the study was the inability of the chosen instrument to 
measure actual collaborative behavior. Rather, the instrument was only able to measure 
respondents’ perception of collaboration. The attendant self-reporting may have 
introduced social desirability bias, in which respondents may falsify their responses in 
order to make themselves look good or to portray themselves in a positive light (Fisher, 
1993; Nederhof, 1985; van de Mortel, 2008). Social desirability bias is common in 
studies centered on socially sensitive issues such as politics, religion, and environment, or 
personal issues (Grimm, 2010). Another limitation was the possible biases I as the 
researcher might bring into the study having worked at the federal level emergency 
management agency at a senior level from June 2012 to June 2016, a period 
corresponding to most of the period to be covered by the study.  
The limitation introduced by the inability to measure actual collaborative behavior 
was ameliorated by sampling only heads of the organizations who were assumed to be the 
most knowledgeable about happenings in their respective agencies. The social 
desirability bias was managed by informing and assuring respondents that their responses 
were nonattributional. My possible biases were addressed through the maintenance of a 
state of heightened self-awareness (Creswell, 2007) and reliance on quantitative methods 
to manipulate the data. 
Significance 
This study contributed to the knowledge on emergency management, especially as 
it relates to Nigeria. The study highlighted the effects of politics on the collaborative 
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disposition of emergency management agencies in Nigeria. Given the widening scope 
and intensity of natural and human-made disasters and emergencies in Nigeria’s recent 
history, the study gave insight into the determinants of collaboration that are germane to 
the local environment. This has the potential of improving emergency response practices 
in Nigeria and contributing to saving lives and/or drastically mitigating the effects of 
disasters and emergencies on the populace.  
Summary and Transition 
This chapter presented the background and the rationale for the study. The chapter 
opened with a description of the topic, the necessity of the study, and the possible social 
change it could engender. These were followed by an articulation of the problem 
statement and the purpose of the study. The research question and hypotheses as well as 
the theoretical framework to guide the study were thereafter presented. The nature of the 
study, pertinent definitions, assumptions, scope, delimitation, limitations, and 
significance of the study were then presented before concluding with a summary of the 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature on the theories of social networks and 
social exchanges, which were used as frameworks for the study. This is followed by an 
exhaustive review of the concepts of collaboration and political affiliations, which are the 
two main variables in the study. The chapter will also present a review of the literature on 
emergency management especially as it relates to Nigeria, the country of interest. Chapter 
3 will present a detailed description of the chosen design and methodology as well as the 
rationale for choosing the approach. Chapter 4 will present the details of how the data 
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were generated and manipulated. It will also present the results and conclude with a 
summary of the answer to the research question. Chapter 5 will present an interpretation 
of the findings in the context of the theoretical framework. The limitations of the study as 
well as recommendations for further research followed by implications for positive social 
change will thereafter be presented. 
14 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The ability of the usual many individuals and organizations involved in 
responding to emergency and disaster situations to work synergistically and 
harmoniously will no doubt reduce losses (Wittmann, Jurisch, & Krcmar, 2015). 
Although the new public management concept, in which governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations come together to resolve public issues, has become 
increasingly popular (Bingham & O’Leary, 2006), emergency management has remained 
a field largely dominated by governmental organizations (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011). In a 
multiparty democracy such as in the United States of America or Nigeria, there exists the 
possibility of different political parties controlling the different tiers of government 
(federal, state, local) at any given time. This research study was aimed at addressing the 
paucity of studies on the effects of political affiliations on collaboration among 
emergency management agencies. This literature review was therefore aimed at 
analyzing and synthesizing literature on the two fundamental concepts and variables that 
underpinned this study: collaboration and political affiliations. The focus of the review 
was how these two concepts interact in emergency management scenarios.  
Organization of Chapter 
This literature review opens with an introduction, followed by a description of the 
strategy for searching for literature, then a review of the extant literature, closing with a 
summary. The introduction to the study elaborated the problem statement by examining 
earlier studies that laid the foundation for the problem statement. The research strategy 
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details the procedure used in sourcing for articles and materials used in the study. The 
review of extant literature presents the salient characteristics and determinants of 
collaboration especially among emergency management organizations. The literature 
review also covers the nexus between politics, public administration, and their probable 
effects on collaboration. The chapter ends with a summary of the chapter and an 
appropriate transition to Chapter 3, which deals with research methodology.  
Research Strategy 
The materials used in this literature review were sourced in two stages. The first 
stage was aimed at getting a sense of the current knowledge on collaboration in 
emergency management in general so as to be able to identify discernable gaps in the 
literature. The second stage was then to focus on the observed gap of interest—in this 
case, the role political affiliations play in the formation and sustenance of collaboration in 
emergency management. In both stages, materials were sources from academic and peer-
reviewed articles obtained from multiple databases through the Walden University 
Library. The databases consulted included 
• Academic Search Premier/Complete, 
• Goggle Scholar, 
• Political Science Complete, 
• ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 
• ProQuest Central, 
• Science Journals, 
• Social Science Journals, 
16 
 
• SAGE Premiers, 
• Statistics and Data, 
• Tests and Measures, 
• Thoreau: Search Multiple Databases, and 
• Political Sciences Collection. 
Searching for articles on collaboration was a little easier as there have been 
several studies on the subject across many fields. To focus the search, I used keywords 
such as collaboration, coordination, and cooperation in conjunction with emergency 
management and disaster management. Coordination and cooperation were used as 
keywords in the search as they were often used interchangeably with collaboration in the 
literature. Disaster management was also often used interchangeably with emergency 
management. Finding articles on political affiliations was a little trickier as the notion 
appeared to still be nebulous in literature. Most studies that broached the subject merely 
presented it as membership of or preference for a political party or an ideology. To 
expand the understanding of the concept, related and other useful concepts such as 
political context, party politics, political ideology, and political parties were used as 
keywords in the search. Searches for collaboration were restricted to the period 2007 to 
2016 while the most current articles of interest were picked for review. However, because 
of the paucity of articles, searches for political affiliation were extended backwards to 
year 2000.  
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Theoretical Foundation 
This study was framed within two interrelated theoretical perspectives. The first 
was the theory of social networks as propounded by Barnes (1954), while the second was 
the theory of social exchanges (Lévi-Strauss, 1969). Both theories are related to the 
extent that they are anchored on the notion of the existence of interdependency of actors 
in a social setting.  
Theory of Social Network 
In the theory of social network, Barnes (1954) contended that the behavior of an 
entity (an individual, a group, or an organization) is conditioned or influenced by the 
structure of social relationships around such an entity. The theory of social network is a 
subset of the general network theory, which hinges on the notion that human behavior is 
best explained by the relative location of the entity within the social structure it must 
operate. Network theory itself has its roots in structural sociology as proposed by the 
likes of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel. Structural sociology 
encompasses an idea that human activities are guided by social structures made up of 
social institutions and patterns of institutionalized relationships (Durkheim, 1893; Marx, 
1959; Simmel, 1950; Spencer, 1876; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1998). Marx (1959) had 
noted that “it is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but, on 
the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness” (p. 43). This raises the 
idea that social structures have a more pronounced effect on human behavior than do 
cultural norms or other subjective phenomena—an idea that has since been one of the 
guiding principles of the study of networks. Consequently, network theory, and by 
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extension social network theory, proposes that social structures are more influential than 
norms and values in determining and explaining an actor’s behavior.  
Homophily and propinquity are two important concepts of social network theory 
(Cook-Craig, 2010). Homophily refers to the assumption that, other factors being the 
same, actors in a social setting are most likely to seek each other out based on similarity 
in characteristics such as experiences, backgrounds, and professional philosophies (Cook-
Craig, 2010; Kadushin, 2004). Propinquity on the other hand refers to the assumption 
that, other factors considered, actors are likely to connect with those that are 
geographically close to them (Cook-Craig, 2010; Kadushin, 2004). Another important 
concept in social network theory is the concept of strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 
1973). Strong ties exist among similar people (Granovetter, 1973) or among professional 
entities that have regular contact with one another (Hansen, 1999; Haythornthwaite & 
Wellman, 1998; Krackhardt, 1992). Actors with similar characteristics are therefore 
expected to have strong ties based on shared purpose, common identity, trust, and an 
efficient source of information and resource sharing (Burt, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Warren, 
Thompson, & Saegart, 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Weak ties, on the other hand, 
characterize entities with divergent and heterogeneous attributes (Burt, 2001; Putnam, 
2000; Warren et al., 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). 
There have been several refinements of Barnes’s (1954) theory of social network. 
One of particular interest was carried out by Mullin and Daley (2009). The authors 
identified political context, financial capacity, and management techniques as the three 
key drivers or indicators of social structure. In line with the social network theory 
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traditions, Mullin and Daley proposed that similarity in political preferences among 
entities encourages collaboration. 
Theory of Social Exchange  
The theory of social exchange is focused on the benefits that entities derive from, 
and contribute to, social interaction, and the structures that guide or within which the 
exchanges take place (Cook & Rice, 2003). The theory proposes that the purpose of 
exchange is to maximize benefits and minimize costs. Decision to enter or continue in a 
social relationship is contingent upon a subjective evaluation of the costs and benefits, 
which is moderated by the expectations of the actors and a comparison with possible 
alternatives. Social exchange theory is anchored on the expectation of reciprocity 
tempered by the level of dependency among actors (Cook & Rice, 2003; Emerson, 1976; 
Homans, 1961; Rusbult, 1983; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Exchanges can take different 
forms: they can be direct, generalized, productive, reciprocal, or negotiated (Cook & 
Rice, 2003; Molm, 1988, 1990, 1994). Direct exchange takes place between two actors 
with each actor's outcomes depending directly on the other actor's behaviors. That is, 
provision of value is directly reciprocal between the two parties, A and B (Figure 1). 
Generalized exchange takes place among three or more actors with indirect reciprocity. 
Generalized exchange “encompasses those social exchange relations in which one actor 
[A] gives resources to another [B], but where such resources are reciprocated not by the 
recipient [B] but rather a third party [C]” (Cook & Rice, 2003, p. 69) within the network 
(Figure 2). Productive exchange (Figure 3) requires the contributions of both actors in a 
relationship for any of the actors to derive any benefit (Lawler, Yoon, & Thye, 2000). 
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Figure 1. Direct exchange structures. Adapted from "Theories of Social Exchange and 
Exchange Network,” by L. D. Molm, 2001, in B. Smart and G. Ritzer (Eds.), Handbook 
of Social Theory (p. 4), London: SAGE. Copyright (2001). 
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Figure 2. Generalized (indirect) exchange structure. Adapted from "Theories of Social 
Exchange and Exchange Network,” by L. D. Molm, 2001, in B. Smart and G. Ritzer 
(Eds.), Handbook of Social Theory (p. 4), London: SAGE. Copyright (2001). 
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Figure 3. Productive exchange structure. Adapted from "Theories of Social Exchange 
and Exchange Network,” by L. D. Molm, 2001, in B. Smart and G. Ritzer (Eds.), 
Handbook of Social Theory (p. 4), London: SAGE. Copyright (2001). 
 
All exchanges carry a level of uncertainty and risk that are directly related to the 
form of exchange (Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 2000). Generalized exchanges typically 
carry the highest risks, followed by reciprocal exchanges, with negotiated exchanges 
bearing the lowest risks (Cook & Rice, 2003). The level of risk is dependent on the 
structure of the outcome. Actors typically jointly agree to the terms of exchange in 
negotiated exchanges. Hence, outcome and costs to all parties are known prior to 
exchange taking place. Exchange takes place in reciprocal and generalized settings 
without actors’ fore-knowledge of the nature of the returns they will receive or if they 
will even obtain any return (Cook & Rice, 2003). Generalized exchange is riskier than 
reciprocal exchange because reciprocity, if it occurs, is indirect. 
Risk and uncertainty can be ameliorated by trust, which can develop as exchange 
expands and partners prove themselves trustworthy (Blau, 1964). In addition to requiring 
trust to blossom, exchange under risk and uncertainty also promotes trust (Lévi-Strauss, 
1969). Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), however, differentiated between trust 
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(expectations of positive response based on respondent’s personal traits) and assurance 
(expectations of positive response based on the existence of an incentive). The authors 
posited that the presence of an assurance incentive structure limits the development of 
trust. In general, negotiated exchange provides greater assurance than reciprocal 
exchange, and reciprocal exchange provides greater assurance than generalized exchange 
(Kollock, 1994; Molm et al., 2000). However, as risk creates opportunities for trust to 
develop, so it creates avenues for exploitation (Kollock, 1994; Molm et al., 2000). In 
generalized exchange that is typical in public policy and administration, Yamagishi and 
Cook (1993) posited that actors must have a relatively high level of general trust in others 
initially for the system to survive and become sustainable. Takahashi (2000) has, 
however, shown that pure generalized exchange systems can still form and endure in the 
absence of high levels of trust or central sanctioning systems, provided actors selectively 
give to recipients whose behaviors satisfy the givers’ criterion of fairness. 
Relevance of Selected Theories to the Study  
As discussed, the theories of social network and social exchange were apt in 
guiding this study on the relationship between political affiliation and collaboration 
among social entities. Both concepts of political affiliation and collaboration can be 
explained by these two chosen theories of social network and social exchange. The 
resolution of this study’s research question, which was to interrogate the effects of 
political affiliation on collaboration, contributed to building upon these theories by 
highlighting some departures. 
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Description and Literature Review of the Constructs of Interest 
In this section, the three related concepts of coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration will first be considered. Thereafter, literature on the dimensions, general 
characteristics and determinants of collaboration will be reviewed. This will be followed 
by a consideration of the concept of emergency management and the nature of 
collaboration in emergency management. The practice of emergency in Nigeria will also 
be reviewed before rounding up the section with a consideration of the interface between 
politics and public administration. 
Collaboration and Related Concepts (Cooperation, Coordination, and 
Collaboration) 
Collaboration remains a popular concept of interest to researchers across several 
disciplines and particularly so in public administration (Bingham & O’Leary, 2006; 
Robinson & Gaddis, 2012). A cursory search of the keyword collaboration carried out on 
April 10, 2016 using the Thoreau multiple databases returned a total of 119,082 peer-
reviewed articles on the subject published between 2010 and 2016. A further analysis of 
the result showed the currency of the subject as a similar search covering the period 
January 2014 to April 2016 returned a total of 36,393 articles. The interest in the concept 
of collaboration is understandable given the desirability of some form of collective action 
in handling the myriad of challenges (often referred to as wicked problems) facing public 
administration in recent times (Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire, 
2006), more so when viewed against the backdrop of scarce resources and rapid changes 
in technology and organizational structure (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Three related 
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concepts of collective action were identified in literature. These were coordination, 
cooperation, collaboration (Amirkhanyan, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006). The three Cs 
as they are often called represent different but complementary levels of experience in 
social interactions (Amici, 2015). A review of the literature suggested a progression in 
the order of collective action from cooperation to coordination and finally collaboration 
(Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
Cooperation  
Cooperation is on the lowest rung of the collective action ladder. Cooperation 
exists when multiple individuals or organizations decide to pool their resources in the 
pursuit of an objective. It presupposes a premeditated willingness on the part of the 
cooperating entities to contribute to the collective efforts of the group (Cienki, 2015). As 
noted by Amici (2015), cooperative processes involve “social interactions in which actors 
incur some costs to altruistically provide benefits to a partner” (p. 383). The interaction 
within the group in a cooperative environment is usually informal and limited to the 
achievement of the objective that has brought them together with no consideration for the 
missions or goals of the constituent organizations. Each cooperating entity retains its 
autonomy and authority, and communication among members is on the basis of necessity 
(Mattessich & Monsey, 1992).  
Coordination 
Guo and Kapucu (2015) described coordination as the management of 
“dependencies among activities” (p. 896). Coordination, as a model of collective action, 
involves the deliberate and conscious efforts of actors to regulate their activities towards 
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the achievement of a set objective. It is a process in which multiple organizations jointly 
design and execute a set of plans and policies aimed at achieving a set objective 
(Aghajani, Amin & Abasgholipour, 2014). It therefore follows that there must be a level 
of compatibility among the overarching missions and goals of the interacting 
organizations (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001a). Coordinating entities must 
also be willing and must have the ability and capacity to contribute to achieving the 
objective (Aghajani et al.). Coordinating organizations continue to function as distinct 
entities while carrying out their unique tasks within the collective action sphere. 
Consequently, while authority remains with individual organizations, some leadership 
and control responsibilities are pooled (Mattessich et al., 2001a). Coordination involves 
the synchronization of the efforts and activities of all contributing entities, hence, one 
organization (the Coordinator) is typically saddled with the leadership and 
decisionmaking responsibilities necessary to ensure harmonious working of the 
constituent parts (Axner, 2015).  
Collaboration  
There are several definitions of collaboration in the literature. Bingham (2008) for 
example described collaboration as “the process of facilitating and operating in multi-
organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by 
single organizations” (p. 250). Roschelle and Teasley (as cited in Baker, 2015) on the 
other hand defined it as “a coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result of a 
continued attempt to construct and maintain a shared conception of a problem” (p. 70). 
Thomson et al. (2007) on their own part defined collaboration  
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[a]s a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through 
formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing 
their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them 
together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial 
interactions. (p. 3) 
From the foregoing, collaboration is a challenging collective action process in that 
it involves bringing together parties with different and sometimes conflicting values and 
purposes, formulating agreeable principles and rules guiding their interactions and 
proffering solutions to problems that are beyond individual constituent parts (Paquet & 
Wilson, 2015). Collaboration is a complex process (Thomson et al., 2007) that is iterative 
and cyclical (Paquet & Wilson, 2015) involving negotiations and renegotiations among 
collaborating entities. Collaboration has become a necessity given that the power, 
resources, and information that are required to resolve contemporary wicked problems are 
often widely and unequally distributed (Paquet & Wilson, 2015). 
 For collaboration to succeed, Paquet and Wilson (2015) posited that four 
conditions must exist. The first condition is that all parties to the collaboration must first 
acknowledge that a problem whose resolution is beyond an individual organization’s 
capacity exists. The second condition is that participating agencies must accept that their 
knowledge of the problem as well as the solutions they may be contemplating are only 
partial and generally inadequate and must therefore be open to learning and to new ideas. 
Third condition is that a thorough understanding of the problem must always precede any 
action and that all collaborators are treated as equals especially as it relates to decision 
27 
 
making. The fourth condition is the presence of a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the 
group’s interactions and provide a guide for determining the necessity for continuing the 
collaboration. 
Dimensions of Collaboration 
The processes leading to collaboration occur synergistically rather than 
incrementally in phases (Thomson et al., 2007). Five notable dimensions of collaboration 
have been identified in literature. The first relating to governance requires participants to 
develop the ability to jointly decide on rules that will guide their interactions (Thomson et 
al., 2007). This process typically involves negotiating an equilibrium (Warren, 1967) 
amidst the conflicting preferences of the collaborating partners (Thomson et al., 2007). 
The second dimension of collaboration relates to administration. Collaborative endeavors 
just like hierarchical management require the existence of administrative structures that 
will delineate roles and responsibilities, provide coordination as well as mechanisms for 
monitoring individual participant’s contribution to the collective in line with the jointly 
agreed terms of the association. Thomson and Perry (2006) refer to these attributes as 
“administrative capacity” (p. 25). However, given the voluntary and decentralized nature 
of participation in collaborative endeavors, “social capacity” (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 
25) that builds relationships is considered even more essential. Social capacity can be 
enhanced by the presence of boundary spanners (Williams, 2002) with skills such as 
ability to “build and sustain effective interpersonal relationships” and to “manage 
interdependency” (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 26). Unlike in traditional hierarchical 
management where roles are fixed and immutable, collaborating partners often take on 
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different roles within the collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). A major administrative 
challenge in collaboration however remains the management of the “inherent tension 
between [partners’] self-interests and [the] collective interests” (Thomson & Perry, 2006, 
p. 26).  
The third dimension of collaboration is rooted in the inherent dual identity of 
collaborators—one as a unique organization with its formal structure and culture, and two 
as a part of a collaborating entity. This dual identity often create tension between the need 
to satisfy individual organization’s goals (self-interest) and the requirements to fulfil the 
objectives of the collaboration (collective interest). Huxham (1996) labelled this tension 
“autonomy-accountability dilemma” (p. 15), and posited that given the voluntary nature 
of collaboration, participants need to justify their participation based on the benefits the 
effort will bring to achieving their individual aims. Collaboration therefore fares better 
when the problem it is meant to overcome is of sufficient importance and urgency to all 
partners (Thomson & Perry, 2006).  
The fourth dimension of collaboration is the mutuality dimension, which has its 
roots in the interdependencies that exist among collaborating partners (Thomson & Perry, 
2006). Collaboration is encouraged when participants are complemented by each other’s 
unique resources (Powell, 1990), or when the issue at hand transcends individual 
organization’s mission—for example as in when it concerns the environment or has to do 
with a humanitarian crisis (Thomson & Perry, 2006). As noted by Chen and Graddy 
(2005), collaboration is promoted when participants are able to “acquire resources from 
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other organizations that they need and do not have but are critical for their continuing 
functioning” (p. 17).  
The fifth and final dimension of collaboration is the trust and reciprocity 
dimension (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaborating partners are often willing to 
collaborate if or when they sense a corresponding willingness on the part of others 
(Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; 1998; Powell, 1990; Thomson & Perry, 2006). In addition 
to reciprocity, trust, which Cummings and Bromiley (as cited in Thomson & Perry, 2006) 
defined as  
a common belief among a group of individuals that another group (1) will make 
“good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit 
and implicit,” (2) will “be honest in whatever negotiations preceded such 
commitments,” and (3) will “not take excessive advantage of another even when 
the opportunity is available” (p. 28),  
is a necessity for a successful collaboration (Bardach, 1998; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Ostrom, 1998; Smith, 1995). Although trust ultimately 
reduces complexity and transaction costs (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Ostrom, 1998; 
Smith, 1995), it nonetheless requires considerable effort and time to be built and nurtured 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). As the level of trust increases, the limiting effects of 
organizational autonomy reduces while mutuality epitomized by common interests 
expands and in turn generate support for new governance and administrative initiatives 
that will enhance the collaborative effort (Thomson & Perry, 2006).  
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Characteristics of Collaboration  
Amirkhanyan (2008), after a review of public management literature (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Bazzoli, et al., 1997; Imperial, 2005; McGuire, 2006; Selden, Sowa, & 
Sandfort, 2006; Thomson, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006), identified a number of 
characteristics of collaboration. Firstly, that collaboration involves the formulation and 
utilization of new rules, procedures, and structures to regulate and guide the interactions 
among the collaborating entities. Secondly, that decisions regarding resources—both 
human and material—management are made jointly; and thirdly, that interactions are 
meant to solve problems that cannot be solved or solved easily by an individual 
organization. The requirement for joint decision making and joint actions among 
collaborating entities necessitates a level of trust in the partners’ competencies in 
contributing to finding solutions to the problems under consideration (Entwistle & 
Martin, 2005).  
Collaboration connotes interactions between/among organizations both on the 
formal and informal levels (Amirkhanyan, 2008). Collaboration in the public sector occur 
in a variety of formats. Collaboration can be vertical through levels of government, or 
horizontal in which several public and private actors with stakes or interests in the 
particular problem of concern are involved (McGuire, 2006). Collaboration can be highly 
formalized. Typical formal collaboration is established through networks that are either 
encouraged (Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003) or mandated by 
law (O’Toole, 1997; Radin et al., 1996). Collaboration in public management can also be 
informal, emergent, and short-term (Drabek & McEntire, 2002). Although collaborative 
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structures are typically flat and self-organizing, it is not uncommon to find collaborative 
networks with a lead organization in the capacity of a “system controller or facilitator” 
(McGuire, 2006, p. 36). 
Mandell and Steelman (2003) had identified five types of collaborative context. 
The first is when collaboration takes place intermittently as in disaster response. 
Collaboration in this context often requires the temporary adjustment of policies and 
procedures by collaborating entities in order to achieve a goal (McGuire, 2006). The 
second context involves the establishment of a “temporary task force” (Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003, p. 203) to resolve a particular problem after which the task force is 
disbanded. The third collaboration context involves permanent or regular interactions 
among several entities focused on tackling a specific challenge. Typical regular 
collaborative arrangements include emergency management planning and preparedness 
(McGuire, 2006). The fourth and fifth levels of collaborative arrangements are 
“coalitions and network structures” (Mandell & Steelman, 2003, p. 204; McGuire, 2006, 
p. 35). While both the coalitions and network arrangements involve activities that are 
preplanned and interrelated, coalitions are typically focused on narrow subjects and 
activities are restricted to within the contributing agency. Network arrangements on the 
other hand focus on broad tasks or situations that cannot be resolved by the simultaneous 
activities of individual collaborating entities. Collaboration often entails resource sharing 
(McGuire, 2006). While the level of resource sharing may be minimal in the intermittent 
and temporary task force collaborative contexts, it is more extensive in the 
permanent/regular and coalition/network contexts (McGuire, 2006).  
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Chana and Clarke (2014) posited that there are three core issues that determine 
the direction or health of collaboration. These are the nature of the relationships, the 
identities of the participating entities, and the established practices. There must be trust 
and respect in addition to regular interactions among collaborating organizations. The 
organizations must also possess the capacity to collaborate (Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 
2010). Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins (2010) identified some of the attributes of this 
capacity to include the availability of required human, financial and technological 
resources to commit to the collective effort.  
Collaboration requires certain ingredients to be successful. According to Parung 
and Bittici (2008), these include the capacity and proficiency of individual members to 
contribute to achieving the goal of the group; the alignment of the participation and the 
expected outcome with the strategic objective of the participants; the existence of 
interdependence among partners; and the ability of partners to contribute substantial 
resources to the collective effort. Other ingredients include the requirement for 
participants to consider the collective action as germane to their success; the ability to 
effectively communicate within the collective; the existence of multiple points of 
interaction among collaborating entities; the formalization of procedures and practices 
among participating organizations; and the requirement for collaborating entities to be 
reliable and dependable. Other important requirements of successful collaboration 
include effective top management support, strong and focused leadership team, and clear 
sense of mission and objectives (Parung & Bittici, 2008; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 
2010). 
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Determinants of Collaboration 
One of the hallmark of democratic governance (especially in a federation) is 
shared policy responsibility across levels of government (Mullin & Daley, 2009). 
Collaboration across jurisdictions in an environment where power and resources are 
decentralized provides an opportunity to take advantage of local knowledge, and the 
expertise and resources available at higher levels of government (Mullin & Daley, 2009). 
Mullin and Daley (2009) identified four important determinants of collaboration. 
According to the authors, the most significant determinant of collaboration revolves 
around management techniques especially one that guarantees “the existence of 
performance incentives for individual bureaucrats” (p. 759). Other determinants include 
the political context of the collective action, the availability of resources (especially at 
lower levels of governance), and “the real and perceived status of local problems” 
(Mullin & Daley, 2009, p. 759).  
According to the theory of institutional rational choice, “individuals respond to 
both rules and incentives” (Mullin & Daley, 2009, p. 773). Collaboration is encouraged 
by the presence of performance incentives (Mullin & Daley, 2009). The authors found 
that collaboration is enhanced and encouraged when it is considered important enough to 
be a major field in personnel’s annual performance reviews. 
Politics have also been shown to influence organizational behavior and 
performance (Meier, 2000; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Wilson, 
1989). Although politicians are unable to exert total control over bureaucratic behavior, 
they can however use incentives and oversight mechanisms to regulate a bureaucratic 
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organization’s actions (Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; 
McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). Hence, as noted by Agranoff and McGuire (2004), 
it is within the realm of possibilities for political authorities to dissuade bureaucrats from 
working together based on what Mullin and Daley (2009) termed “political incongruity” 
(p. 769). The political environment therefore plays an important role in determining the 
disposition of authorities (especially at subnational levels) to vertical collaborative 
activities as “agencies will invest more time building relationships across sectors and 
across levels of government if they have support from their communities and political 
superiors” (Mullin & Daley, 2009, p. 773).  
Availability of resources can either be negatively or positively correlated to 
collaboration. Collaboration typically involves high costs (Vangen & Winchester, 2013). 
On the one hand, possession of meagre financial and human resources may therefore 
discourage collaboration (Mullin & Daley, 2009). Collaboration across boundaries must 
bring additional benefits which outweigh the transaction costs (Barjak & Robinson, 
2008). On the other hand, collaboration presents an opportunity for poor subnational 
agencies to tap from the expertise and other resources available at higher levels of 
governance. In the same vein, large resource rich local agencies may consider vertical 
collaboration unnecessary.  
The findings in several studies suggested a positive correlation between problem 
severity and collaboration, especially between government and nongovernmental actors 
(Bryson et al., 2006; Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002; McGuire, 2006; Mullin & Daley, 
2009; O’Toole, 1997; Thomson & Perry, 2006). This finding appeared to be inapplicable 
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to interagency collaboration as Mullin and Daley (2009) also found that “the severity of 
problem conditions does not appear to motivate increased interagency collaboration” (p. 
774). The authors posited that this finding may be the result of a perceived interference 
rather than assistance with their work on the part of the agencies at the lower levels of 
governance. 
Emergency Management 
Emergency and disaster are two related concepts that are often used 
interchangeably in literature as there is yet no consensus on the boundary between the 
two (Wittmann et al., 2015). Caruson and MacManus (2011) described emergency as a 
situation that poses an immediate risk to health, life, property, or environment and 
thereby requiring urgent intervention to forestall the deterioration of the situation. 
Disaster on the other hand is considered as a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society resulting from a calamitous event leading to widespread human, 
material, economic or environmental losses and impacts (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005; 
Quarantelli, 1998). The often-used delineator between the two concepts is the coping 
capacity of local authorities. An emergency is said to have become a disaster when the 
event exceeds the coping capabilities of the local authorities (Moss, 2013; Quarantelli, 
1998; Schafer, Carroll, Haynes, & Abrams, 2008). However, McGuire and Silvia (2010) 
had shown that most events in contemporary times fall into the category of wicked 
problems that often require cross-jurisdictional efforts to resolve. Hence, expectedly, the 
structures, processes, procedures, and systems through which these disruptive or 
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potentially disruptive events are managed are often described interchangeably in 
literature as emergency or disaster management.  
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) classified disasters 
(and by extension, emergencies) into 6 categories: Natural; Technological; Civil or 
political; Hybrid; Humanitarian or complex; and Emerging infectious diseases (Medina, 
2015). Early propositions of disaster studies by pioneers such as Prince, Carr, Powell, 
Fritz and Mathewson, Chapman, and Stoddard suggested the occurrence of disasters in 
linear, sequential phases (Coetzee & van Niekerk, 2012; De Smet, Schreurs, & Leysen, 
2015). The phases were the “preliminary or prodromal phase”; the “dislocation and 
disorganization phase”; the “readjustment and reorganization phase”; and the intervening 
“confusion-delay phase… between the onset of the disaster [and] the time the emergency 
plans begin to operate” (De Smet et al., 2015, p. 323). Focus was therefore on response 
and relief activities. Subsequent studies (Dynes 1970; Quarantelli, 1982) had revealed 
“that disasters follow a general temporal sequence regardless of [the category or] the 
disaster agent” (De Smet et al., 2015, p. 323) and hence the authors canvassed for an all-
hazards-approach to the study and management of emergencies and disasters. The result 
of this campaign was the four-phased comprehensive emergency management (CEM) 
concept proposed by the National Governors’ Association (1979).  
The CEM is comprised of the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery 
phases (De Smet et al., 2015; Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). The mitigation 
phase is concerned with “reducing societal vulnerability and preventing or stopping 
disasters before they happen” (De Smet et al., 2015, p. 323). Emergency management 
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activities carried out during the phase are therefore aimed at eliminating or reducing the 
probability of occurrence of a disaster (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). No 
amount of mitigation can guarantee the nonoccurrence of disasters. Hence the 
preparedness phase focuses on developing plans, processes, and procedures that will help 
save lives, minimize loses, and enhance response operations when the disaster eventually 
occurs (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). The response phase kicks off 
immediately after the disaster has occurred. Response activities are aimed at assisting the 
victims of the disruptive event, “reducing the probability of secondary damage” and 
preparing the ground for “speed[y] recovery operations” (Thorvaldsdóttir & 
Sigbjörnsson, 2014, p. 50). The recovery phase is focused on returning the society to its 
predisaster normal or better conditions (De Smet et al., 2015; Thorvaldsdóttir & 
Sigbjörnsson, 2014). A cyclical relationship exists among the four phases and activities 
carried out within one phase typically influence the succeeding phase (De Smet et al., 
2015). Emergency management can therefore be described as the managerial function 
responsible for articulating and operationalizing policies and procedures aimed at 
reducing societal vulnerability to hazards, coping with emergencies/disasters when they 
eventually occur, and returning society to normal or better functioning state (Blanchard et 
al., 2007).  
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Figure 4. Disaster management cycle depicting the four-phased comprehensive 
emergency management (CEM) proposed by the National Governors’ Association. 
Adapted from “Comprehensive Emergency Management - A Governor’s Guide,” by 
National Governors’ Association, Washington, DC: Center for Policy Research. 
Copyright (1979).  
 
Some scholars (McEntire, 2004; McEntire et al., 2002; Neal, 1997; Rubin, 2012; 
Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014) had however questioned the practical and 
theoretical reliability of the CEM model. Their contention was that although the four 
phases connote “groups of activities [that are] performed in sequential order” 
(Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014, p. 48), Neal had shown that the sequence of 
activities proposed by the CEM were not sacrosanct in all disasters and suggested that the 
disaster management cycle was better considered a functional rather than a temporal 
model. McEntire et al. (2002) agreed. Building on the argument that disaster management 
is essentially the management of activities required to meet disaster-related objectives 
(Hayes & Hammons, 2002) and the fact that “functions, in the management context, is a 
term for groups of activities required to meet a common objective, regardless of when 
they are performed” (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, (2014, p. 48), Thorvaldsdóttir and 
Sigbjörnsson canvassed for the adoption of the concept of disaster-function management 
by substituting the CEM’s four disaster phases with eight disaster functions. The eight 
functions which are based on the eight core objectives of disaster management and the 
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activities necessary to meet them are: “Disaster-risk analysis; Disaster-risk mitigation; 
Operational preparedness; Impact operations; Rescue operations; Relief operations; 
Recovery operations; [and] Systematic learning” (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014, 
p. 51). 
Despite the novelty of the proposal by Thorvaldsdóttir and Sigbjörnsson (2014), 
the proposition is yet to fully catch on, and the four-phased CEM model remains the most 
widely adopted emergency/disaster management framework for now (De Smet et al., 
2015). 
Collaboration in Emergency Management 
The occurrence and effects of emergencies and disasters often extend beyond a 
single policy or jurisdictional boundary. The ensuing complex and uncertain environment 
typically requires concerted efforts from multiple stakeholders to manage (Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002; Drabek, Tamminga, Kilijanek, & Adams, 1981; Kapucu, Arslan, & 
Demiroz, 2010; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 
2006). With the increase in the number and severity of emergencies and disasters such as 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina in the United States (Bodeau et al., 2009); the massive 2012 
nationwide flooding and the fallout of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (National 
Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2014) in recent times, collaboration in 
emergency management had become a necessity across governmental boundaries 
(Bryson et al., 2006; Callahan & Holzer, 1994; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Moynihan 2005; 
Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wise 2006) and between public and 
nonpublic organizations (Bingham & O’Leary, 2006; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012; 
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McGuire, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Vertical and horizontal collaboration have 
therefore become an enduring feature of emergency management (McGuire & Silvia, 
2010).  
There have been contentions if truly the networks formed during emergency or 
disaster management qualify as collaborations (Robinson & Gadis, 2012). This 
contention stems from the argument that disaster networks made up of heterogeneous 
actors (Robinson & Gadis, 2012) are ad-hoc and temporary in nature (Comfort, 1993; 
Kapucu & Garayev, 2012; Moynihan, 2007) with some of the actors having nothing to do 
with emergency management in the normal course of their business and only showing up 
during the emergency to render assistance. However, this argument can only hold true in 
the restrictive consideration of emergency management as being synonymous to the 
management of the response phase (Waugh & Streib, 2006). For emergency management 
to yield a positive outcome, collaboration is essential throughout the life cycle of 
emergency management and not only during the response phase (Kendra & Wachtendorf 
2003; Moynihan 2005; Kiefer & Montjoy, 2006). The effectiveness of emergency 
management collaborative networks is improved when the relationships are continuously 
nurtured and maintained (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012; Milward & 
Provan, 2003). Emergency management is therefore enhanced by regular and routine 
interactions among collaborating entities through frequently scheduled planning and 
training exercises (Bodeau et al., 2009; Meunier, 2013; Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
Waugh and Streib (2006) contended that “collaboration [is] much more 
challenging in emergency management than in other public arenas” (p. 138). Although 
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collaborative governance requires a shift from the traditional hierarchical model of 
management (Waugh & Streib, 2006), emergency management in addition to the salient 
of collaborative governance often functions with some form of hierarchy (Waugh & 
Streib, 2006; Moynihan, 2005a), what Moynihan (2005b) termed hierarchical network. 
“A hierarchical network uses hierarchical control and rules to help manage a network of 
multiple organizations” (Moynihan, 2005b, p. 3). The predisposition to embed a 
hierarchical model in a collaborative environment can be explained by the need to have 
“somebody to take charge, or possibly someone to be held accountable” during 
emergencies or disasters (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 138). The utility of this hierarchical 
network in emergency management was also demonstrated by Milward and Provan 
(2003). 
Emergency Management in Nigeria 
Formalized disaster/emergency managemnet within the territoty called Nigeria 
can be traced back to the establishment of the Fire Brigade by the colonialists in 1906 
(National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010). The scope of the Fire 
Brigade’s mandate however extended beyond just fire fighting to safeguarding lives and 
properties and the provision of humanitarian services during emergencies. The period 
immediately following independence in 1960 saw a breakdown of the systematic 
approach to disaster management as disasters were considered security issues and 
responses were coordinated from the offices of the head of state and the governors on ad-
hoc basis (National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010). The 1972/73 
devastating drought experienced by the country led to the establishemnt of the National 
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Emergency Relief Agency (NERA) in 1976. NERA’s mandate was restricted to only the 
response and recovery phases of emergency management.  
In line with the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction (UN-IDNDR), the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) commenced the 
process of expanding the scope of NERA’s mandate in 1990. This culminated first in the 
upgrade of the organization to an independent agency under the Presidency in 1993, and 
then a transmutation to NEMA in 1999 with the mandate to manage disasters in all its 
ramifications. The NEMA Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999 equally gave legal 
backing to the establishment of state emergency management agencies (SEMAs) and the 
local government emergency management authorities (LEMAs). The three tiers of 
emergency and disaster management agencies coordinate all activities relating to their 
mandate at their respective levels of governance.  
The national disaster management framework (NDMF), that serves as a 
regulatory guideline for effective and efficient emergency management, “defines 
measurable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures, and aligns key roles and 
responsibilities of disaster management stakeholders across the nation” (National 
Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010. p. ii). The NDMF provides for both 
vertical and horizontal coordination. This has led to the establishment of the Institutional 
Framework for Disaster Management in Nigeria as depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Institutional framework for disaster management in Nigeria depicting 
horizontal and vertical relationship among institutions involved in emergency 
management in Nigeria. Adapted from The National Disaster Management Framework 
(p. 10), by National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010, Abuja: NEMA. 
Copyright (2010) by NEMA. Adapted with permission. 
 
The NDMF also recognized the evolving requirement to pay attention to issues 
relating to disaster risks and the functionality of disaster management (Thorvaldsdóttir & 
Sigbjörnsson, 2014). The NDMF therefore describes specific authorities and best 
practices for managing disasters under seven focus areas together with a sufficiency 
criterion, almost mirroring the disaster-function management proposed by 
Thorvaldsdóttir and Sigbjörnsson (2014). The thematic areas recognized by the NDMF 
are: institutional capacity; coordination; disaster risk assessment; disaster risk reduction; 
disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation; disaster response; and disaster recovery; 
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with facilitators and enablers being the sufficiency criteria (National Emergency 
Management Agency [NEMA], 2010).  
Politics and Public Administration 
The conventional thought on the relationship between politics and public 
administration canvasses a separation of the two fields (Deason, Hammond, & Aka, 
2011). This “politics-administration dichotomy” was promoted by Woodrow Wilson in a 
bid to develop effective administrative services that is not bogged down or unduly 
influenced by political interference and manipulations from the political establishment 
(Deason et al., 2011, p. 13). This view was equally supported by White, who in his 1926 
seminal work advocated a public service that is nonpolitical and only focused on 
executing government policies effectively and efficiently (Deason et al., 2011). 
According to this school of thought, “[t]he bureaucracy was to administer, in an impartial 
and nonpolitical fashion, the programs created by the legislative branch, subject only to 
judicial interpretation” (Milakovich & Gordon, as cited in Deason et al., 2011, p. 13).  
An alternative view of the relationship between politics and public administration 
that is fast gaining ground posits that politics and administration “are two parts of the 
same mechanism” of governance (Woodruff, as cited in Deason et al., 2011, p. 13). The 
view is encapsulated in the complementarity model which according to Svara (1999) is 
“characterized by interdependency, extensive interaction, distinct but overlapping roles, 
political supremacy, and administrative subordination coexisting with reciprocity of 
influence in both policy making and administration” (p. 678). This in essence means that 
“administrative agencies influence the policy process and are, in turn, influenced by 
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political factors and external actors” (Deason et al., 2011, p. 14). Recent studies have 
shown that political party affiliation often drive policy preferences among Americans 
(Milazzo, Adams, & Green, 2012). 
Political Affiliation 
In this study, political affiliation was taken to be the adoption or close association 
of an entity to a political party based on congruency of ideology, policies, programs, or 
other interests. Party affiliation is a “foundational political identity” (Vraga, 2015, p. 
487). Predisposition to align with a political party is often dictated by ideology, 
worldview, and values (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 
2003; Lakoff, 2002; Tetlock, 1986). Hence, political preferences typically endure (Green, 
Palmquist & Schickler, 2002). Political affiliations therefore tend to influence attitudes 
and responses to policies (Peterson, Skov, Serritzlew, & Ramsoy, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 
2006). 
Political Affiliation, Collaboration, and Emergency Management 
There is virtually no prior study on the relationship between political affiliation 
and collaboration in general, although Henry (2011) posited that shared ideologies tend to 
be positively correlated to collaborative ties. However, a link had been established 
between the two concepts in the field of scientific research among Spanish universities 
(Olmeda‐Gómez, Perianes‐Rodriguez, Ovalle‐Perandones, Guerrero‐Bote, & Anegón, 
2009). Studies have also suggested that political affiliation can affect the management of 
emergencies, for example in the distribution of relief materials (Bennett & Carney, 2011; 
Oteng-Ababio, 2013).  
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Summary and Transition 
The literature review was aimed at exploring available knowledge on the concept 
of collective action and how it is affected by political affiliation especially in emergency 
management environments. Collaboration was found to represent a higher-order level of 
collective action than cooperation or coordination, with cooperation being on the lowest 
end of the continuum (Alter & Hage, 1993; Golicic, Foggin, & Mentzer, 2003; 
Mattessich & Monsey, 1992; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Cooperation provides the 
foundation for coordination by enlisting voluntarily efforts. Although both cooperation 
and coordination may occur during the formative stages of collaboration, collaboration 
involves a deeper lever of interaction and integration among partners. It is also a more 
complex, long term relationship requiring greater commitment from participants 
(Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaboration is promoted when participants are willing 
(Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; 1998; Powell, 1990; Thomson & Perry, 2006) and can 
complement one another resources-wise (Chen & Graddy, 2005; Powell, 1990). 
Collaboration can occur vertically or horizontally (McGuire, 2006) and typically results 
in formulation of new rules, joint decision making, and resource sharing (Entwistle & 
Martin, 2005). The key determinants of collaboration were identified as management 
techniques, availability of resources, perceived severity of the problem to be solved, and 
political context (Mullin & Daley, 2009).  
For emergency management, the four-phased all-hazards-approach CEM 
comprising mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases remains the most 
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widely adopted emergency/disaster management framework (De Smet et al., 2015; 
Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). 
Collaboration among governmental organizations involved in emergency 
management (vertical collaboration) has become inescapable given the ‘wicked’ nature of 
the challenges thrown up by emergencies in recent times (Bryson et al., 2006; Callahan & 
Holzer, 1994; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Waugh & Streib, 
2006; Wise, 2006). While the possibility of politics influencing public policy and 
administration (and vice-versa) had since been established in the seminal works of 
Woodruff and Waldo (as cited in Deason et al., 2011) and more recently by Svara (1999), 
studies on the relationship between political affiliation and collaboration among 
government agencies are practically nonexistence.  
Chapter 3 will outline the cross-sectional study design that was used for the 
exploration of the relationship between political affiliations and collaboration among 
government agencies involved in emergency management in Nigeria. The chapter will 
present a description of the population, sampling and sampling techniques, and 
instruments used in the study. The operationalization of variables, threats to validity, 
ethical protection of the participants will also be discussed, and the chapter will close 
with a summary.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of political 
affiliations on collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. This 
chapter opens with a restatement of the research question and hypotheses. This will be 
followed by the role of the researcher, the research design, and rationale for the choice of 
the design. Thereafter, the operationalization of the variables, measurements, and the 
instruments used will be discussed. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
population, sampling and sampling procedures, and the procedure for recruitment, 
participation, and data collection. The data analysis plan, threats to validity, and ethical 
procedures adopted will also be discussed before concluding with a summary and 
transition to Chapter 4.  
Restatement of the Research Question and Hypotheses 
This quantitative study hinged on the assumption that collaboration would be 
stronger between same-party agencies than between different-parties agencies. The 
research question and hypotheses used to explore the veracity of this assumption among 
emergency management agencies in Nigeria were the following: 
Research Question: Does alignment of political affiliation affect collaboration 
among emergency management agencies.  
H0: Collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency 
management agencies differing in political affiliation and between agencies in the same 
political affiliation. 
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Ha: The perceived collaboration strength is significantly higher for emergency 
management agencies of similar political affiliation than those with different affiliations.  
Resolving the research question and testing the hypotheses would first require 
determining the existence of collaboration among emergency management agencies in 
Nigeria, then verifying the existence of differences in the perceived strength of 
collaboration between agencies with similar political alignment on one side and agencies 
with differing political alignment on the other. Finally, I tested the strength of the 
differences in collaboration between the two groups. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as a researcher in this study was to collect the data necessary for testing 
the hypotheses set out in the study. I was also responsible for applying appropriate 
statistical methods to manipulate and analyze the data and determine the relationships 
between the study variables, that is, political affiliations and collaboration, and to 
determine the generalizability of the findings. I was equally responsible for interpreting 
the findings. In all of these, I maintained objectivity by adopting a systematic empirical 
approach and by remaining detached from the participants so as not to influence their 
responses in any way.  
Research Design and Rationale 
This study was aimed at assessing the influence of political preferences on 
collaborative behaviors among emergency management agencies. Collaboration was the 
dependent variable for the study while the nature of the alignment of political affiliation 
of the emergency agencies was the independent variable. Concomitant variables such as 
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the agencies’ financial capacity and management techniques (Mullin & Daley, 2009) 
were treated as covariates for this study. The study was carried out using quantitative 
research method with a cross-sectional, non-experimental design. This quantitative 
method and design was very suitable for a study such as this aimed at exploring the 
effects of similarity or differences in political affiliations on the perception of the strength 
of collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria after controlling for 
the agencies’ financial capacities and management techniques. 
Cross-sectional studies are typically relatively more time-efficient when 
compared to longitudinal studies, as data are collected at one point in time. Therefore, I 
was not faced with any major time constraints in collecting data except in locating 
prospective participants as some of them had left office since the proposed reference 
period for the study (2011 to 2015). Some efforts were expended to locate some of the 
respondents and to get the questionnaire to them. At the end, questionnaires were 
dispatched and responses returned without any serious resource constraints that could 
adversely affect the conduct of the study.  
Cross-sectional studies are quite popular in public policy studies. They have the 
advantages of being low cost while allowing for the collection of data on many variables 
from very many participants that are widely dispersed. Cross-sectional studies also allow 
for the collection of data on attitudes and behaviors that can become useful for other 
researchers. The design also helps avoid complications that usually arise from use of 
longitudinal studies’ data, such as serial correlation of residuals (Creswell, 2007). They 
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are also easily amenable to generalizations, especially if studies are based on a 
representative sample of the population.  
Operationalization of Variables 
The two key variables in this quantitative cross-sectional study were (a) the 
independent variable: the alignment between emergency management agencies in their 
political affiliation, and (b) the dependent variable: the perceived strength of 
collaboration between the agencies. These variables were operationalized in this study as 
follows: 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable for this study was the alignment of emergency 
management agencies in their political affiliation. This was a nominal variable with two 
categories: same party and different parties alignment. The categorization afforded the 
comparison of the perceived strength of collaboration between same-party and different-
parties groups. Consequently, the independent variable was a dichotomous variable; 
measurement was useful in determining the different affects on the perceived strength of 
collaboration between agencies whose political affiliation aligned with their collaborators 
and the agencies whose political affiliation did not align with their collaborators.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the study was the perception of the strength of 
collaboration among the emergency management agencies. It was an ordinal level 
variable measured by the 17-point multidimensional collaboration scale. The responses to 
the 17 statements were reduced to a composite variable, which was treated as 
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interval/quantitative variable indicating the strength of collaboration between the 
agencies and can be further categorized as none, weak, or strong collaboration 
(Granovetter, 1973). 
Measurement  
There are several instruments that can be used to measure the degree/level of 
collaboration. Some of these include Wilder Survey of Collaboration (Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001b) and Collaborative Practice Assessment Tool (Office of 
Interprofessional Education and Practice, 2009). Most of these instruments, however, are 
overly specific for the field or group for which they were designed and were therefore 
unsuitable for this study, although they are considered reliable measures of collaboration. 
A more suitable instrument for the study was the 17-point collaboration measure 
instrument proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). The survey questionnaire comprised two 
sections. The first section was directed at obtaining information on the nature of tenure of 
the respondents and the nature of the emergency management organization. The second 
section comprised 17 statements crafted to measure collaboration between the agencies. 
This section was modelled after the 17-point collaboration measure instrument proposed 
by Thomson et al. The statements used by the original instrument were maintained with 
slight adjustments in wordings to reflect the entities being surveyed. The statements were 
closed-ended questions aimed at gauging respondents’ behaviors and attitudes in relation 
to interactions with other actors in a group. Responses to Questions 1 to 14, which 
covered the governance, administration, autonomy, and mutuality dimensions of 
collaboration, were measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 meaning not at all and 7 
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meaning to a great extent. Questions 15 to 17 covered the norms dimension of 
collaboration and their responses were also measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 
meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree.  
A notice was sent to the lead author informing her of my intention to use the 
instrument and acknowledge the use accordingly in my dissertation report. She replied 
consenting to my use of the instrument. 
Measurement Scales  
The independent variable for this study, alignment of political affiliation of 
emergency management agencies, was measured on a dichotomous (nominal with two 
categories) scale. The dependent variable, perception of the strength of collaboration 
among emergency management agencies, was measured on an ordinal scale. The 
responses to the 17 statements designed to measure the dependent variable were reduced 
to a composite variable measured on an interval scale.  
The Survey Instrument 
The collaboration scale proposed by Thomson et al. (2007) was anchored on the 
theoretically and empirically proven five key collaboration dimensions of governance, 
administration, autonomy, mutuality, and norm (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 
2007). The 17-question scale was derived through structural equation modeling followed 
by “confirmatory and exploratory analysis” to identify the most valid and reliable 
multidimensional scale of collaboration (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 14). The R2 values of 
the 17 indicators derived through structural equation model correspond to the reliability 
measures of the indicators and are related to the lambda (λ) estimates that measure the 
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validity of the indicators (Thomson et al., 2007). Eleven of the 17 indicators have lambda 
(λ) coefficients of between .80 and .95. Three others have lambda (λ) coefficients of 
between .75 and .80 while the remaining three have coefficients of between .66 and .67. 
These coefficients are believed to be high enough for the equation and the indicators to 
be considered to have passed the reliability and validity tests. This is particularly so given  
that no commonly held rules or standards currently exist that objectively identify 
a point at which the standardized lambda (λ) coefficient passes a “validity test” or 
the R2 passes a “reliability test” except to assert that the closer to 1, the more valid 
and reliable (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 20).  
The 17 indicators multidimensional scale of collaboration had been validated by 
Chen (2008). The same survey questions of the 17-indicator collaboration scale were 
used in the study of interorganizational networks in Los Angeles County’s Family 
Preservation Program and the findings supported Thomson et al.’s (2007) structural 
equation model of collaboration. 
Survey Statements  
The survey statements as shown in Table 1 were aimed at measuring the 
perception of collaboration among agencies. The 17 statements cover the five dimensions 
of collaboration: governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, and norm (trust). The 
questions measure respondents’ perception of collaboration.  
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Table 1 
 
Survey: 17-Point Collaboration Scale (Perception) 
Number Survey Question Dimension of Collaboration 
1. The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency 
indicated above take your organization’s opinions seriously 
when decisions are made about the collaboration.  
Governance 
2. Your organization brainstorms with the Federal or State 
Emergency Management Agency indicated above to develop 
solutions to mission-related problems facing the 
collaboration.  
Governance 
3. You, as a representative of your organization in the 
collaboration, understand your organization’s roles and 
responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.  
Administration 
4. The meetings of your organization with the Federal or State 
Emergency Management Agency indicated above 
accomplish what is necessary for the collaboration to 
function well.  
Administration 
5. Your organization and the Federal or State Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above agree about the goals 
of the collaboration.  
 
Administration 
6. Your organization’s tasks in the collaboration are well 
coordinated with those of the Federal or State Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above.  
Administration 
7. The collaboration with the Federal or State Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above hinders your 
organization from meeting its own organizational mission.  
Autonomy 
8. Your organization’s independence is affected by having to 
work with the Federal or State Emergency Management 
Agency indicated above on activities related to the 
collaboration.  
 
Autonomy 
9. You, as a representative of your organization feel pulled 
between trying to meet both your organization’s and the 
collaboration’s expectations.  
 
Autonomy 
10. The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency 
indicated above and your organization have combined and 
used each other’s resources so all partners benefit from 
collaborating.  
Mutuality 
11. Your organization shares information with the Federal or 
State Emergency Management Agency indicated above to 
strengthen their operations and programs.  
Mutuality 
(table continues) 
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Number Survey Question Dimension of Collaboration 
12. You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration 
is appreciated and respected by Emergency Management 
Agency indicated above.  
Mutuality 
13. Your organization achieves its own goals better working 
with the Emergency Management Agency indicated above 
than working alone.  
Mutuality 
14. Your organization and the Emergency Management Agency 
indicated above work through differences to arrive at win–
win solutions.  
Mutuality 
15. The people who represent the Emergency Management 
Agency indicated above in the collaboration are trustworthy.  
Norm (Trust) 
16. Your organization can count on the Emergency Management 
Agency indicated above to meet its obligations to the 
collaboration.  
Norm (Trust) 
17. Your organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with 
the Emergency Management Agency indicated above rather 
than leave the collaboration.  
Norm (Trust) 
 
Note. The name of the emergency management agency was indicated on the survey 
questionnaire. Adapted from “Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration,” by A. M. 
Thomson, J. L. Perry, and T. K. Miller, 2007, Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory, 19(1), pp. 18-19.  
 
Population, Sampling, and Sampling Procedures 
The units in the target population for this study were governmental agencies 
responsible for managing emergencies at the three levels of governance in Nigeria. The 
sampling frame for this study was the list of the 812 heads of governmental emergency 
management organizations at the federal (1), states (36), federal capital territory (1), and 
local government areas (774) that were in office during the period May 2011 to May 
2015. Three sampling procedure options were considered and the one that is likely to 
yield the most useful data for the study was selected. 
The first option was to ask the state agencies to rate their collaboration with 
selected local government agencies within their jurisdictions; this could yield data on 
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same party alignment as the party in control of the state was also in control of all local 
governments within the state. The second option was to ask each state to rate the 
collaboration with every other state and the federal agency. This could yield data on both 
similar and different party alignment of political affiliations. However, this would mean 
that each state respondent would have to complete 37 questionnaires. This was 
considered impracticable. A third option was to ask the states to rate their collaboration 
with the federal agency (hence, every state was to complete only one survey each), while 
the federal was to rate the collaboration with all the states. This option appeared to be the 
most feasible in that it will afford the generation of data for both same-party and 
different-parties collaborations and was therefore adopted. The option nonetheless had 
some shortcomings, the primary one being the non-inclusion of local government levels 
in the sample. However, this shortcoming was ameliorated by the assumed 
representativeness of the data from the states since the states and their constituent local 
governments typically have same party alignment of political affiliation. The second 
challenge was the requirement for the federal agency to complete 37 questionnaires (one 
for each of the 36 states and the federal capital territory). This challenge was, however, 
surmounted by appeal to the respondent to understand the importance of the study and 
patience, to give him sufficient time to complete the questionnaires at his own time. 
Consequently, the Federal Agency provided data on its perception of the strength 
of collaboration with each of the 37 State Agencies. Twenty-four of these State Agencies 
were under the control of the same political party controlling the Federal Agency while 
the remaining 13 were under the control of other parties. The 37 State Agencies in turn 
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provided data on their perception of the strength of collaboration with the Federal 
Agency. These generated 24 same-party and 13 different-parties data sets on the 
perception of collaboration for comparison and for the testing of the hypothesis that 
collaboration is significantly higher within the same-party group.  
The G*Power 3.1.9.2 power analysis software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2015) was used to determine the sample size for the study. According to Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, and Buchner (2007), “G*Power was designed as a general stand-alone power 
analysis program for statistical tests commonly used in social and behavioral research” 
(p. 175). Three important parameters were required to derive the sample size. These were 
the effect size (f), the alpha level (α), and the Power. Effect size, which is a measure of 
the magnitude of the difference of some phenomenon between groups (Kelley & 
Preacher, 2012; Sullivan & Feinn, 2012), can only be computed after data collection and 
analysis. Hence, it is customary to apply an estimate a priori based on previous findings 
from similar studies or from convention (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). Sullivan and Feinn 
(2012) had reported Cohen’s (1969, 1988) categorization of effect sizes often used in the 
social sciences as small (f  =  .2), medium (f  =  .5), and large (f ≥ .8). The magnitude of 
the differences in the level of collaboration between same-party and different-parties 
emergency management agencies were expected/assumed to be high hence a large effect 
size (f ≥ .8) was used. 
 The alpha level which is a measure of the Type 1 error (the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) needs to be kept as low as possible. An alpha 
α-value of .05 set by Fisher (1925) is usually used in the social sciences (Cowles, & 
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Davis, 1982). Power, which is a measure of the departure from the null hypotheses or the 
probability of detecting the existence of a true effect, needs to be sufficiently high 
(Skelly, 2011). A power value of .80 is conventionally considered as ideal in the social 
sciences while .70 falls within acceptable range (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). 
Employing the G*Power 3.1.9.2 software to carry out a priori power analysis using t 
tests. Means: Difference between two independent means (two groups) and supposing a 
large effect size (f = .8), alpha (α) = .05, power = .80, and allocation ratio = .6 (based on 
the ratio of membership of the sample frame) yielded a total sample size of 44 made up 
of Group A sample size = 28 and Group B sample size = 16. However, because of the 
envisaged challenge in generating data from the emergency management agencies at the 
local government areas and the proposal to limit data collection to the federal and state 
levels, only 37 useful samples were available. Adjusting the power analysis for this 
limitation yields a Power of .73 and total sample size of 36 made up of 23 in Group A 
(same party) and 13 in Group B (different parties). Consequently, a sample size of 36 
emergency management agencies with 23 falling under same party alignment of political 
affiliation and 13 falling under different parties alignment of political affiliation was 
required to carry out this study on the effects of political affiliation on collaboration. The 
relationship between Power and the sample size is presented in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Relationship between power and sample size generated using G*Power 3.1.9.2 
power analysis software. 
 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Proper procedures needed to be followed to ensure that the identification, 
screening, and recruitment of human subjects for a study yield sufficient number of 
participants and was carried out in an ethical matter (Treweek et al., 2010).  
The name and contact of the prospective participant at the federal level was 
already known to me, both of us having worked together from June 2012 to June 2016. 
The names and contacts of prospective participants at the state level were sourced from 
the state liaison offices at the federal capital, Abuja, where I reside and from contacts at 
the federal agency. A short telephone text message introducing myself and a notification 
of intention to speak with the prospects was sent to all. This step was necessary because 
of the prevailing habit among some Nigerians to refuse to answer calls from unfamiliar 
numbers. The text messages were followed by phone calls during which I introduced the 
study to them, explaining why they were chosen and highlighting the benefits and costs 
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of participating in the study. I then sought their authorization to send the survey 
questionnaire to them and confirm the address and mode of delivery they would prefer. 
Appropriate arrangements for returning the surveys were also agreed with individual 
respondents. A combination of hand delivery, courier service, and e-mail were used to get 
the questionnaires to respondents. Responses were returned through same means. A few 
of the respondents elected to send their responses via WhatsApp (indicating only the 
question number and corresponding score) because of the difficulties they encountered in 
uploading a scanned copy of the completed questionnaire as an attachment to an e-mail.  
The confirmation by the prospective participants of their preferred address and 
mode of delivery of the questionnaire was considered as informed consent. However, an 
informed consent form expatiating on the study, the benefits, and my responsibilities 
especially regarding confidentiality and the participants’ privacy as well as the voluntary 
nature of participation was also included in the questionnaire package for the respondents 
to sign. A notice was also included stating that while respondents were encouraged to 
sign the informed consent form, they may decide not to, as their completion and return of 
the survey would be taken as consent. This step was aimed at enhancing confidentiality 
of participants’ responses.  
Demographic information sought included participants’ nature of tenure (whether 
political appointee, elected, or career civil servant), and nature of organization (formal 
established by law, ad-hoc, or advisory). Data on collaboration was collected using the 
17-point collaboration measure instrument proposed by Thomson et al. (2007, pp. 18-19). 
Data on alignment of political affiliation was imputed from information obtained from 
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the Independent National Electoral Commission on the political party in control of the 
various levels of government during the period of interest (May 2011 to May 2015).  
I informed the participants that their participation and responses would be kept 
confidential and that they could exit or withdraw from the study at any time.  I also 
provided them my contact details as well as that of my Dissertation Committee Chair in 
case they needed clarifications on any aspect of the study. Participants were also 
informed that they may be contacted after the return of the surveys should a need for 
clarification arise.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The International Business Machine (IBM)’s SPSS version 23.0 for Windows was 
used to analyze the data generated from the survey.  
Preanalysis Data Screening 
Preanalysis data screening was carried out to ensure that data had been correctly 
entered and to check for missing data and outliers. Descriptive statistics like frequency 
distributions were used to find incorrectly entered data and identify missing values. The 
data were found to be correctly entered and there were no missing data or outliers.  
Detailed Analysis Plan 
Descriptive statistics such as frequencies, means, modes, and percentages were 
planned to be carried out to expatiate on the characteristics of the alignment of political 
affiliations and the nature of interactions among the agencies. These were to help 
illuminate the presence or otherwise of collaboration and the differences in the perception 
of the strength of collaboration between same-political parties and different-political 
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parties controlled grouped agencies. For the test of the significance of the differences in 
the strength of collaboration between the two groups, two options were available. The 
first was to use nonparametric methods of analysis while the other was to use parametric 
methods. The data generated was be amenable to nonparametric methods particularly 
because the dependent variable (perception of the strength of collaboration) was 
measured on an ordinal (Likert) scale while the independent variable (alignment of 
political affiliation) was measured on a nominal (dichotomous) scale.  
The proposed nonparametric test was the Mann-Whitney U test while the 
proposed parametric test was the t test. Both tests are essentially similar as they measure 
the differences in the means of two samples taken from the same population. They are 
however different to the extent that t test is carried out under the assumption that the data 
are normally distributed while no such assumption is made for Mann-Whitney U test. The 
two tests were the ideal tests to carry out since the aim was to determine group 
differences. In the case of this study, the aim was to determine the significance of mean 
group differences in the perceived strength of collaboration based on the alignment of 
political affiliations (same-party vs. different-parties) while controlling for financial 
capacity and management techniques. In addition to screening the data for missing and 
outlier values, appropriate tests to determine the normality of subgroups and linearity of 
relationship between the two variables were carried out. The skewness and kurtosis 
coefficients of the variables were obtained to determine their normality while linearity 
was determined by examining residuals plots (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013).  
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Threats to Validity 
Threats to External Validity 
The hallmark of quantitative studies is to afford generalization to a larger 
population and/or across populations. This study was conducted in the hope that it will 
present conclusions on the effects of alignment of political affiliation on collaboration 
that would be generalizable to the wider population of governmental emergency 
management agencies in Nigeria on the one hand, and to other governmental agencies 
outside of emergency management on the other hand. One major way to achieve this was 
to ensure that the sample share similar characteristics with the population. This study was 
designed in such a manner as to ensure representativeness of the sample. Another 
possible threat to validity in this study was selection bias. Although efforts were made to 
ensure representativeness of the sample, the truth however is that representativeness 
cannot be perfect as humans are unique. Selection bias was particularly of concern in this 
study given that selection of units was limited to the federal and states emergency 
management agencies because of the difficulty in sampling the local government areas as 
explained in the section on Population, Sampling, and Sampling Procedure. It was 
however assumed that the responses from the states will be representative of those of the 
local governments given that the political parties in control of the states also control the 
local governments within the states.  
Threats to Internal Validity 
There are number of situations that threatened the internal validity of this study. 
The first was subject effect or participant reactivity. This typically occurs when or if a 
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participant’s response is affected by the fact that he or she is part of a study. Although 
participant reactivity is presented as a threat to internal validity here, it equally threatens 
the external validity of the study as it limits generalization of conclusions. Another threat 
to the internal validity of the study was history effects. This occurs when events in the 
environment could account for changes in the outcome of the scores on the variables or 
the scores of a group. For this study, the intervening event that threatened the internal 
validity of the study was that the political arena in Nigeria had changed significantly from 
what it was during the period of interest to the study. At the time of the study, three of the 
erstwhile parties; the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria People's Party 
(ANPP), and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) have merged to form a new 
party, the All Progressives’ Congress (APC). The APC was now the ruling party at the 
federal level and in control of 25 out of the 36 states and 551 out of the 774 local 
government areas as of the time the study was being carried out. This amounted to a total 
of 557 (68.59%) out of the 812 jurisdictions in Nigeria. Also, the rate at which politicians 
changed party affiliations was very high in Nigeria (Ikechukwu, 2015; Opadere & 
Agbana, 2015). It was not impossible to find a respondent who was in the then ruling 
party (PDP) during the period of interest to the study (2011 to 2015) but in the ruling 
party (APC) when the study was being carried out (circa 2017 to 2018). These situations 
could bias and affect the responses of the participants and thereby threaten the internal 
validity of the study. The history effects were addressed by emphasizing the period of 
interest in the questionnaire and encouraging participants to limit their responses to 
events during that period.  
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Threats to Construct Validity 
Threats to construct validity arise when clear distinctions are not made between or 
among different constructs that are part of a broader concept. To ensure construct 
validity, and forestall the measurement of multiple constructs, broad concepts of interests 
must be narrowed down to constructs that are easily measurable. For this study, the broad 
concept of interest was ‘collective action’. This has been narrowed down to 
‘collaboration’, which after exhausive literature review was properly defined and 
operationalize to include its five dimensions as proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). 
Ethical Procedures 
As the researcher, I took appropriate steps to ensure beneficence and 
nonmaleficence of this study. This involved seeking and obtaining the Walden University 
Institutional Review Board approval (09-25-17-0301327) and abiding by all the 
requirements of the approval. Appropriate informed consent was also extracted from the 
participants. Since the preferred research method for the study is survey, respondents had 
access to the survey instrument and other accompanying information regarding the aim of 
the study and the responsibilities of the respondents. Although the study presented 
minimal risk of harm to the participants, I nonetheless completed the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH)’s online course on protecting human subject research participants to 
better understand the requirements for protecting research subjects. It was difficult to 
guarantee total anonymity of research participants because of the nature of the population 
and research design. For example, the respondent at the federal level is well known. 
However, steps were taken to provide as much anonymity as practicable. These included 
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substituting identifiers like names of states with codes. In addition, appropriate steps were 
taken to protect the confidentiality of the participants. Data generated from the survey 
will be used only for the purpose for which they were collected. The data will be kept 
secured in a safe location for a period of 7 years before they are destroyed.  
Summary and Transition 
Chapter 3 on research method presented the details of the design and 
methodology for the study. The study was proposed to be a quantitative research study 
with a cross-sectional non-experimental design to examine the effects of political 
affiliation on collaboration among emergency management agencies. Agencies were 
grouped into two based on the alignment of their political affiliation. The significance of 
the differences in the perception of the strength of collaboration between the two groups 
will then be measured. The target population is comprised of the governmental agencies 
responsible for managing emergencies at the three levels of governance in Nigeria. The 
target population size was therefore N = 812. The required sample size for the study was 
36 made up of 23 for same-party group and 13 for different-parties group. Sampling was 
restricted to the federal and state levels because of the challenges of generating data from 
the local government level and the congruence of alignment of political affiliation 
between the states and their respective local government areas. Data on alignment of 
political affiliation was imputed from information obtained from the Independent 
National Electoral Commission on the political party in control of the various levels of 
government during the period of interest (May 2011 to May 2015). Data on the 
perception of the strength of collaboration was collected using the 17-point collaboration 
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measure instrument proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). A 7-point Likert scale graduation 
of the responses to the survey on collaboration was adopted with 1 equating not at all and 
7 equating to a great extent. The International Business Machine (IBM)’s Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.0 for Windows was used to analyze the 
data generated from the survey. Preanalysis data screening was carried out to ensure that 
data have been correctly entered and to check for missing data and outliers. Descriptive 
statistics, Mann-Whitney U test and t test were proposed to be used to resolve the 
research question. Threats to the validity of the study were identified to include selection 
bias, participant reactivity, history effects, and the broad nature of the concept of 
collaboration. Appropriate steps to address the threats were presented. Steps to ensure 
beneficence and nonmaleficence of this study were also enumerated. The following 
Chapter 4 will present the results of the statistical analysis carried out to answer the 
research question. Chapter 5 will present the interpretation of the findings, limitations of 
the study, recommendations for further research, the potential impact for positive social 
change, and the study’s conclusion. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of political 
affiliations on collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. In 
Chapter 4 of the study, the demographical data relating to the study are presented first. 
These are followed by the descriptive statistics of data generated. Thereafter, the 
hypotheses tested are restated followed by statistical analyses to test the hypotheses. The 
statistical analyses were carried out using the independent samples t test aimed at testing 
the significance of the difference in the means between two groups. The initially 
proposed Mann-Whitney test was discarded as the data were found to be normally 
distributed and hence amenable to the independent samples t test. The benchmark for 
statistical significance was set at the generally accepted alpha level α = .05. Thirty-eight 
emergency management agencies in Nigeria constituted the sample for the study. This 
was made up of one federal agency, one federal capital territory agency (treated as a 
state), and 36 states agencies. The federal agency presented its perception of the level of 
collaboration between it and the other 37 emergency management agencies while the 
other 37 agencies individually presented their perception of collaboration with the federal 
agency. These yielded a total of 37 peer-perceptions scores that were combined to derive 
a composite score. 
Preanalysis Data Screening 
The data for this study were derived from responses to survey questionnaires sent 
to the heads of the 38 emergency management agencies. The questionnaire consisted of 
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17 questions designed by Thomson et al. (2007) to measure perception of collaboration. 
All the 38 participants responded to the questionnaires. Responses were reviewed for 
consistencies and completeness and thereafter inputted into SPSS version 24.0 for 
Windows. Responses were found to be complete and without outliers. On the survey, 
Questions 7, 8, and 9 that were framed in the negative perspective were also recoded to 
correspond with the other questions that were framed in the positive perspective. 
Descriptive and Inferential Statistics 
Reliability of the Likert Scale Questions  
The reliability and internal consistency of the Likert scale questions used were 
determined using Cronbach's alpha test. Cronbach’s alpha typically measures the 
correlations between different items on the same test. It indicates if several items that 
propose to measure the same general construct produce similar scores or not (Brace, 
Kemp & Snelgar, 2006). Following the guidelines proposed by George and Mallery 
(2010), where α > .9 excellent, >.8 good, >.7 acceptable, >.6 questionable, >.5 poor, and 
<.5 unacceptable, the results of the reliability analysis for the Likert scale questions 
measuring the perception of the strength of collaboration (α = .88) were excellent. The 
results of the reliability test are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 
 
Results of the Test of Reliability of the Likert Scale Questions 
Cronbach’s alpha Cronbach’s alpha based on 
standardized items 
N of items 
.876 .888 17 
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Basic Characteristics of the Agencies in the Sample 
The independent variable for this study, alignment of political affiliation of 
emergency management agencies, was measured on a dichotomous (nominal with two 
categories) scale. All agencies (n = 38, 100%) were formal organization established by 
law or an executive directive. Analysis also showed that there were more career civil 
servants (n = 21, 55%) than political appointees (n = 17, 45%) heading the emergency 
agencies. The sample consisted of more same party affiliation participants (n = 24, 65%) 
than differing parties affiliations participants (n = 13, 35%). Frequencies and percentages 
for the demographic data representing the characteristics and distribution of the 
participating agencies are presents in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
 
Characteristics and Distribution of the Participating Agencies 
Agency Characteristics n % 
   
Nature of the Emergency Management Agency   
       Formal organization established by law or executive 
directive 
38 100 
       Ad-Hoc body 0 0 
       Advisory 0 0 
Nature of tenure of head of agency   
       Elected 0 0 
       Political appointee 17 45 
       Career civil servant 21 55 
Type of political affiliation   
       Same party affiliation 24 65 
       Differing parties affiliations 13 35 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable, perceptions of the strength of collaboration among 
emergency management agencies, was collected from the responses to the 17-question 
collaboration scale proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). The response to each of the 17 
statements was measured on a 7-point Likert scale, an ordinal measure in nature 
(Appendix A). The responses to the 17 statements/questions on the survey were reduced 
to a composite score. The composite is an ad hoc score of the perceived strength of 
collaboration among the emergency agencies. The 17 responses were also grouped into 
the composites by the five aspects of collaboration—governance, administration, 
autonomy, mutuality, and norm (trust)—to see how the perceptions differ between the 
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two groups. The definition of the dimensions of collaboration and the number of 
questions in the questionnaire they are based on are presented in Table 4. Appendices B 
to D present the raw scores of the perceived strength of collaboration by the states, the 
federal, and combined (total score) agencies respectively, while Appendix E presents the 
collaboration scores of the five groups of responses.  
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Table 4 
 
Definition of the Five Dimensions of Collaboration and Corresponding Number of 
Questions on the Questionnaire  
Collaboration 
Aspect 
Meaning Number of Questions 
Governance Requirements to jointly make decisions about the 
rules that will govern partners’ behavior and 
relationships; and, to create structures for reaching 
agreement on collaborative activities and goals 
through shared power arrangements. 
2 
Administration Requirements to establish an effective operating 
system for interaction that includes clarity of roles 
and responsibilities, communication channels that 
enhance coordination, and mechanisms to monitor 
each other’s activities in relation to roles and 
responsibilities. 
4 
Autonomy  Requirements for reconciling self-interest 
(achieving individual organizational missions and 
maintaining an identity that is distinct from the 
collaborative) and a collective interest (achieving 
collaboration goals and maintaining accountability 
to collaborative partners).  
3 
Mutuality Requirements to forge mutually beneficial 
relationships that satisfy individual partner’s 
differing interests without loss to themselves 
through consensus.    
5 
(table continues) 
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Collaboration 
Aspect 
Meaning Number of Questions 
Norm Requirement to demonstrate a willingness to 
interact collaboratively and a belief among a group 
that partners will behave in good-faith and be 
honest in their dealings with one-another.  
3 
 
Note. From Thomson & Perry (2006); Thomson et al. (2007). Derived through structural 
equation modeling followed by “confirmatory and exploratory analysis” to identify the 
most valid and reliable multidimensional scale of collaboration (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 
14).  
 
Overall composite score of perception of collaboration. The overall composite 
(total) score for the perception of collaboration among emergency management agencies 
is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
 
Composite Score of the Perceived Collaboration Strength 
Agencies Perception   Composite 
Scores  
  
n Min. Max. M SD 
Combined perception of strength of collaboration 37 3.88 6.62 5.62 0.60 
 
Perceived collaboration strength by five dimensions. The total scores of the 
five dimensions of the perception of collaboration are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6 
 
Scores of the Five Dimensions of the Perception of Collaboration 
Determinants of 
Collaboration Min. Max. M SD 
Governance 2.50 7.00 5.3514 .98682 
Administration 4.38 7.00 5.8514 .65672 
Autonomy 2.67 7.00 5.3288 1.07259 
Mutuality 3.30 7.00 5.6324 .75390 
Norm 4.00 7.00 5.7387 .75823 
 
Normality Assumptions 
Although distribution is usually assumed to be normal in large samples (> 30 or 
40) regardless of the shape of the data (Ghasemi & Zahedias, 2012, p. 486), the 
assumption of normality of subgroups was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) test in 
addition to screening the data for missing and outlier values. The results of the S-W test, 
skewness, kurtosis, and Q-Q plot supported the normality assumption. The results of the 
S-W test are presented in Table 7. The skewness and kurtosis statistics are presented in 
Table 8 while the Q-Q plots are in Figures 7 and 8.  
Table 7 
 
Results of Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Test of Normality of Subgroups 
Subgroup n S-W p 
Same party affiliation 24 .96 .41 
Different parties affiliations 13 .94 .44 
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Table 8 
 
Results of Skewness and Kurtosis Tests of Normality of Subgroups 
Subgroup Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
Same party affiliation -.4 (.47) .26 (.92) 
Different parties affiliation -1.01 (.62) 1.42 (1.19) 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Normal Q-Q plot of perception of collaboration among agencies with same 
political affiliation.  
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Figure 8. Normal Q-Q plot of perception of collaboration among agencies with different 
political party affiliation.  
 
Restatement of the Research Question and Hypotheses  
This study was aimed at assessing the influence of political preferences on 
collaborative behaviors among emergency management agencies. Collaboration was 
treated as the dependent variable for the study while the nature of the alignment of 
political affiliation of the emergency agencies was the independent variable. The 
quantitative study was hinged on the assumption that collaboration will be stronger 
between same-party alignment than between different-parties alignment agencies. The 
research question and hypotheses used to explore the veracity of this assumption among 
emergency management agencies in Nigeria are restated. 
Research Question: Does alignment of political affiliation affect collaboration 
among emergency management agencies?  
79 
 
H0: Collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency 
management agencies differing in political affiliation and agencies with the same 
political affiliation. 
Ha: The perceived collaboration strength is significantly higher for emergency 
management agencies of similar political affiliation than those with different affiliations.  
Statistical Analyses 
The independent sample t test was conducted to determine the significance of the 
differences in the perceived strength of collaboration between the agencies with similar 
political affiliation and those with different political affiliations. 
Independent Sample t Test 
The independent sample t test was performed to compare the average perceived 
strength of collaboration between the agencies with similar political affiliation and those 
with different political affiliations assuming equal variance between the two groups (See 
result of Levene’s test in Table 9).  
Five dimensional-perception scores. Results showed that none of the five 
dimensions was significantly different between the two groups (see Table 9).  
Overall perception scores. The results of the tests indicated that the difference in 
the overall perceived level of collaboration was not significant between the two groups: 
Msame = 5.72, SD = .56; Mdifferent = 5.42, SD = .65; t(35) = 1.49, p = .15. According to the t 
tests, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The results of the t tests are presented in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9 
 
Results of the Independent Samples t Tests for Collaboration and its Five Dimensions 
Areas 
Mean (SD) 
Levene’s test 
for Equality of 
Variancesa 
t test for 
Equality of 
Mean 
Same Party 
Affiliation (N 
= 24) 
Different 
Party 
Affiliation (N 
= 13) 
   F Sig     t df 
Total 
collaboration 
 
5.72 (.56) 5.42 (.65) .375 .544    1.492      35 
Governance 
dimension of 
collaboration 
 
5.51 (.86)  5.06 (1.16) 1.071 .308 1.347      35 
Administration 
dimension of 
collaboration 
 
5.96 (.61)  5.65 (.72) .753 .391 1.362      35 
Autonomy 
dimension of 
collaboration 
 
5.35 (1.16)  5.30 (.93) 1.209 .279   .140      35 
Mutuality 
dimension of 
collaboration 
 
5.77 (.59)  5.39 (.96) 2.122 .154 1.497      35 
Norm dimension 
of collaboration 5.85 (.80) 5.53 (.65) .904 .348 1.269      35 
 
a Equal variances assumed 
* Significant at ≤ .05 
 
Summary 
This quantitative study examined whether political affiliation alignment of 
Nigerian emergency management agencies made a difference on their collaboration. The 
t-test results of the data analysis indicated that there was no significant difference 
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between the average scores of the perceived collaboration level between the two groups 
of agencies. This study, therefore, failed to reject the null hypothesis (H0) that 
collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency management agencies 
differing in political affiliation and between agencies in the same political affiliation. In 
the ensuing Chapter 5, these findings will be discussed and cross-referenced to 
propositions in the literature. The Chapter 5 will also present the limitations of the study, 
recommendations for further research, the potential impact for positive social change, and 
the study’s conclusion. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of political 
affiliation alignment on perceived collaboration strength among emergency management 
agencies in Nigeria. This chapter includes a review and interpretation of the results, 
evaluation of the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and 
implications for positive social change.  
Summary of the Results 
The data for this study were derived from responses to 7-point Likert scale survey 
questionnaires sent to the heads of 38 emergency management agencies in Nigeria. The 
questionnaire, aimed at measuring perception of the strength of collaboration between the 
federal and the states’ emergency management agencies, was modelled after the 17-
question survey designed by Thomson et al. (2007). All the 38 participants responded to 
the questionnaires. The sample agencies, on the whole, showed a fairly strong perceived 
collaboration level. The study showed no significant difference in the level of 
collaboration among emergency management agencies with similar political affiliation 
when compared with the level among agencies with nonsimilar political affiliation.  
Limitations of the Study 
A major design limitation of this study was the inability of the survey to measure 
actual collaboration. Collaboration is one of those abstract concepts that are difficult if 
not impossible to measure. Consequently, the study had to settle for a survey that 
measured the perception of collaboration. Another design limitation had to do with 
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history effects, which threatened the internal validity of the study. Because the study was 
set in the period from 2011 to 2015, efforts had to be made during follow-up telephone 
calls to remind participants to focus their responses on this period. This was even though 
this instruction was clearly written on the questionnaire. The reminder was particularly 
useful for participants who were still in office, some of whom indicated during 
conversation that they would have responded based on current happenings if not for the 
reminder. A final limitation worthy of mention is a sample/data limitation. The power 
analysis carried out required an ideal sample size of 44 to provide a Power of .80. 
However, due to the availability of only 38 useful samples, the study had to settle for a 
Power of .73, which in any case is still acceptable.  
Interpretation of Findings 
There were two propositions that this study needed to address. The first was to 
establish the strength of collaboration among the emergency management agencies while 
the second was to determine whether there was any significant difference between the 
level of collaboration among agencies that have similar political affiliation when 
compared to the level among agencies with differing political affiliations. The results 
showed that the strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies in 
Nigeria was perceived to be generally high. The t-test results negated the assumption that 
collaboration will be stronger among agencies with similar political party affiliation by 
finding that there was no significant difference between the mean of the strength of 
collaboration between the same-party and different-parties affiliated agencies. This 
84 
 
finding ran contrary to findings in literature (Henry, 2011; Mullin & Daley, 2009). Some 
of the plausible reasons for this deviation are presented below. 
Culture of Rampant Political Nomadism in Nigeria 
The deviation of the finding from the trend in literature may be explained by what 
Ikechukwu (2015) described as rampant political nomadism in Nigeria. Contrary to 
Vraga’s (2015) position that political affiliation is a foundational political identity 
dictated by ideology, worldview, and values (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost et al., 
2003; Lakoff, 2002; Tetlock, 1986), political affiliation in Nigeria appeared to be 
dependent more on ephemeral considerations. Hence, the rate at which people changed 
their membership of political parties, and by extension their political party affiliation, in 
Nigeria was very high (Ikechukwu, 2015; Opadere & Agbana, 2015). This could account 
for the observed absence of significant difference in the strength of collaboration between 
the same-party and the different-parties groups.  
Sample Size  
A sample size of 300 to 500 would be considered good to very good for a 
quantitative study involving a population of 812 (Comrey & Lee, 1992; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996). Vanvoorhis and Morgan (2007) recommended a sample size of 30 per 
group when conducting an independent samples t test. The power analysis for this study 
using the G*Power 3.1.9.2 power analysis software prescribed an ideal sample size of 44. 
However, useable sample size for the study was 38. This could have contributed to the 
deviation of the findings from the established norm in literature. 
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Timing of the Study 
The retrospective cross-sectional nature of the study meant that participants were 
required to report on the perception of collaboration they had in time past. This could 
have introduced bias due to history effects that could have contributed to the departure of 
the findings from the norm in literature. 
Nature of Instrument 
The instrument used for the study was designed to measure the five determinants 
of collaboration operationalized with a 17-indicator scale (Thomson et al., 2007). 
However, given the nebulous nature of the concept of collaboration, only the perception 
of collaboration could at best be said to be measurable. Even then, the measurement is 
subjective and could therefore have some effects on the outcome of the study.  
Recommendation for Future Research 
The findings of this study cannot be said to be conclusive. Future studies could 
ascertain the plausibility of the political nomadism explanation given above. Future 
studies could therefore investigate the effects or consequences of rampant political 
nomadism on public administration. The impact of the concept of homophily, that is, 
similarity in characteristics such as experiences, backgrounds, professional philosophies 
(Cook-Craig, 2010; Kadushin, 2004) on the findings could also be explored in future 
studies. It is also not clear if the peculiarity of emergency management being an aspect of 
public administration that aims to protect lives and properties and return society to 
normal after an emergency or a disaster contributes to the findings. Consequently, 
research on the effects of political affiliation on collaboration in other areas of public 
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administration in Nigeria could be carried out to validate the findings of this study. A 
focus on the health sector is particularly recommended because the sector shares the 
mandate of protection of life with emergency management. Another angle that could be 
explored in future research is to carry out a similar study but set within a different time 
frame when the political alignment configuration is different. Finally, as this study was 
conceptualized to test the veracity one of the established models of the determinants of 
collaboration in emergency management outside the Western Hemisphere, it would be 
expedient to validate the result of this study with researches set in other non-Western 
Hemisphere countries outside Nigeria. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
This study was carried out to examine how political affiliations inhibit or promote 
collaboration among emergency management agencies. The findings, however, suggested 
that political affiliations play little or no role in determining the strength of collaboration 
among emergency management agencies. This is a good thing and pleasant news that 
needs to be widely disseminated to further encourage collaboration across party lines. 
These findings also give credence to and encourage the drafting and implementation of 
emergency management policies that are party-blind. The implication for positive social 
change of this is that more energy can be focused on the other determinants of 
collaboration, that is, improving management techniques and making resources available. 
These could ultimately contribute to making emergency management more effective and 
efficient, thereby reducing the adverse effects of emergencies and disasters on the 
citizenry. Another implication of the findings of this study to positive social change is the 
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affirmation of the importance of research in public administration. The departure of the 
findings from the general trend in literature showed the need to continue to conduct 
research on collaboration and its effects on public administration.  
Conclusion 
This study was carried out to examine the influence of political affiliation on the 
level of collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. To do this, it 
was first necessary to establish the existence and strength of collaboration among 
emergency management agencies in the country before investigating the existence of 
differences based on political affiliations. The study showed that indeed, emergency 
management agencies in Nigeria do collaborate and the strength of their collaboration is 
high. Regarding the influence of political affiliation on the level of collaboration, the 
study found no significant influence as the perception of the strength of collaboration 
remained the same among agencies that have similar political party alignment as well as 
among those with different political party alignment.  
The finding appeared to be at variance with the trend in literature, which 
suggested that collaboration should be stronger among agencies with similar political 
party alignment. It was opined that the variation could be because of the peculiarity of the 
Nigerian political terrain where political nomadism seemed to be the order of the day. 
Consequently, it was recommended among others that further studies be carried out on 
the effects of political affiliation on collaboration in other sectors of public administration 
in Nigeria and in other countries outside the Western Hemisphere to validate the findings 
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of this study. It was also recommended that future researches could investigate the 
consequences of rampant political nomadism on public administration.  
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE PERCEPTION OF COLLABORATION 
 
PEAMBLE 
  
 You are invited to take part in a research study titled “Political Affiliations and 
Inter-Agency Collaboration in Emergency Management in Nigeria” The study is 
about the effects of political affiliations on the willingness and ability of emergency 
management agencies to work together in the discharge of their responsibilities. The 
researcher is inviting heads of Emergency Management Agencies at the Federal and State 
levels during the period 2011 to 2015 to be in the study.  
 
 This study is being conducted by a researcher named Charles Otegbade, who is a 
doctoral student at Walden University.  You might already know the researcher when he 
was serving as the Director of Search and Rescue (DSAR) at the National Emergency 
Management Agency, but this study is separate from that role. 
 
 Kindly review the attached Consent Form detailing the voluntary nature and other 
obligations regarding the study. If you agree to participate in the research study, kindly 
complete the survey and return to the researcher. 
 
PART 1 – DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
1. The name of your emergency management agency ……………………………… 
 
 
2. Nature of the agency: 
 
a. Formal organization established by law or an executive directive. 
b. Ad-Hoc body. 
c. Advisory. 
d. Other (Kindly indicate) 
………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Nature of tenure of head of the agency: 
 
a. Elected. 
b. Political appointee. 
c. Career civil servant. 
d. Other (Kindly indicate) 
………………………………………………………….. 
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PART 2 – SURVEY QUESTIONS  
 
The survey statements below are aimed at measuring your perception of the collaboration 
between your Agency and the ……………………………………..* Emergency 
Management Agency. On the seven-point scales below, circle the number that best 
indicates your overall assessment of this collaboration: 
* To be indicated by the researcher 
 
1. The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above* take your 
organization’s opinions seriously when decisions are made about the collaboration. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
2. Your organization brainstorms with the Federal or State Emergency Management 
Agency indicated above* to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the 
collaboration. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
3. You, as a representative of your organization in the collaboration, understand 
your organization’s roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
4. The meetings of your organization with the Federal or State Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above* accomplish what is necessary for the 
collaboration to function well. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
5. Your organization and the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency 
indicated above* agree about the goals of the collaboration.  
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
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6. Your organization’s tasks in the collaboration are well coordinated with those of 
the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above*. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
7. The collaboration with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency 
indicated above* hinders your organization from meeting its own organizational mission. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
8. Your organization’s independence is affected by having to work with the Federal 
or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above* on activities related to the 
collaboration. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
9. You, as a representative of your organization, feel pulled between trying to meet 
both your organization’s and the collaboration’s expectations. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
10. The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above* and your 
organization have combined and used each other’s resources so all partners benefit from 
collaborating. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
11. Your organization shares information with the Federal or State Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above* to strengthen their operations and programs. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
12. You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and 
respected by Emergency Management Agency indicated above*. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
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13. Your organization achieves its own goals better working with the Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above than working alone. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
14. Your organization and the Emergency Management Agency indicated above* 
work through differences to arrive at win–win solutions. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 To a great extent 
 
15. The people who represent the Emergency Management Agency indicated above* 
in the collaboration are trustworthy. 
 
Strongly disagree      1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Strongly agree 
 
16. Your organization can count on the Emergency Management Agency indicated 
above* to meet its obligations to the collaboration. 
 
Strongly disagree      1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Strongly agree 
 
17. Your organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with the Emergency 
Management Agency indicated above* rather than leave the collaboration. 
 
Strongly disagree      1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Strongly agree 
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Appendix B: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration–States 
 
Notes: 
Nature of Agency:  A – Established by Law or Executive Directive. 
Nature of Tenure:   A – Elected; B – Political Appointee; C – Career Civil Servant. 
Political Party Affiliation: 0 – Same Party Affiliation; 1 – Different Parties Affiliation. 
S-AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
TENURE
POLITICAL  
PARTY 
AFFILIATI
ON Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q7REV Q8REV Q9REV
1 A C 0 2 2 6 2 6 2 5 5 5 3 6 3 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
2 A C 0 5 4 6 5 4 5 3 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 2
3 A C 0 4 5 6 5 6 5 3 3 3 5 6 5 5 3 5 5 6 5 5 5
4 A C 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
5 A B 0 2 5 4 6 6 3 4 1 1 5 7 6 7 5 4 7 6 4 7 7
6 A B 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 A C 0 6 5 7 6 5 6 1 1 1 7 7 5 7 1 6 7 7 7 7 7
8 A C 0 5 5 5 4 6 4 2 2 1 6 6 4 6 6 4 5 5 6 6 7
9 A B 0 6 5 5 7 6 5 1 2 3 7 7 6 7 3 7 7 6 7 6 5
10 A B 0 6 6 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
11 A B 0 4 3 5 3 4 4 2 2 2 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 7 6 6 6
12 A B 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
13 A B 0 6 5 5 4 5 4 2 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 7 6 7 6 4 4
14 A B 0 5 4 7 7 6 6 2 4 6 6 6 6 3 4 6 6 5 6 4 2
15 A B 0 6 5 5 6 6 7 1 1 5 6 6 7 6 5 6 5 6 7 7 3
16 A C 0 7 6 7 7 7 6 1 1 5 6 7 6 7 2 7 6 1 7 7 3
17 A C 0 6 7 7 5 3 5 5 6 4 6 7 6 7 4 3 2 7 3 2 4
18 A C 0 7 7 7 7 6 6 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 4 7 7 7 7 7 7
19 A B 0 6 4 7 5 7 5 1 1 2 6 7 6 7 5 7 5 6 7 7 6
20 A B 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7
21 A C 0 3 5 7 6 6 6 2 5 2 4 5 5 4 3 5 5 5 6 3 6
22 A B 0 4 5 7 5 5 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 1 7 7 7 7 7 7
23 A C 0 5 4 5 4 3 4 1 3 2 5 5 5 6 3 3 5 4 7 5 6
24 A B 0 4 4 7 4 7 7 1 1 1 6 6 4 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7
25 A B 1 4 4 4 6 6 5 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 7 7 7
26 A B 1 7 7 6 7 7 7 1 1 1 6 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7
27 A C 1 5 4 4 4 5 2 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 3 6 6 5 2 3 3
28 A C 1 6 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 7 6 6 7 4 7 7 7 7 7 7
29 A C 1 3 6 4 5 5 4 1 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 7 7 5 7 6 6
30 A C 1 5 5 7 5 5 5 1 1 1 6 6 6 7 1 5 5 7 7 7 7
31 A B 1 6 5 6 6 7 6 1 1 4 6 6 7 2 1 5 5 7 7 7 4
32 A C 1 5 6 6 6 6 6 1 6 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 5
33 A C 1 5 5 6 5 4 5 3 1 1 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 7 5 7 7
34 A C 1 2 2 7 7 7 2 5 4 6 4 3 6 7 1 7 7 7 3 4 2
35 A C 1 6 7 7 6 7 7 1 1 3 7 7 5 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 5
36 A C 1 3 2 7 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 7 7 7
37 A C 1 6 5 7 6 6 6 1 2 2 5 7 6 7 7 6 5 7 7 6 6
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Appendix C: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration–Federal 
 
Notes: 
Nature of Agency:  A – Established by Law or Executive Directive. 
Nature of Tenure:   A – Elected; B – Political Appointee; C – Career Civil Servant. 
Political Party Affiliation: 0 – Same Party Affiliation; 1 – Different Parties Affiliation. 
N-AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
TENURE
POLITICAL  
PARTY 
AFFILIATI
ON
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q7REV Q8REV Q9REV
1 A C 0 6 5 6 6 6 5 1 1 1 5 4 4 5 4 5 6 5 7 7 7
2 A C 0 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 1 4 1 7 7 7 5 4 7 7 1 7 4
3 A C 0 7 7 6 6 7 6 1 1 1 5 6 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7
4 A C 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 1 6 6 7 7 1 7 7
5 A B 0 6 6 7 5 5 6 2 1 2 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 5 6 7 6
6 A B 0 7 6 6 6 6 7 1 2 4 7 6 6 6 4 6 6 7 7 6 4
7 A C 0 6 6 7 6 6 6 2 2 2 6 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
8 A C 0 7 6 7 6 7 6 1 1 2 6 6 7 6 7 7 4 6 7 7 6
9 A B 0 6 4 4 6 5 6 1 1 1 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 7 7 7
10 A B 0 6 6 5 5 5 6 1 1 1 4 6 5 4 4 5 5 6 7 7 7
11 A B 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 1 1 1 7 7 7 6 4 5 7 6 7 7
12 A B 0 6 7 7 7 6 7 3 5 4 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 5 3 4
13 A B 0 5 6 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 2 3 3
14 A B 0 6 6 7 7 7 7 4 4 5 7 7 7 7 6 5 7 7 4 4 3
15 A B 0 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 2 2 2
16 A C 0 6 6 7 6 7 6 5 6 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 3 2 3
17 A C 0 5 4 7 4 5 6 4 7 6 3 4 7 5 6 1 5 6 4 1 2
18 A C 0 6 6 4 5 4 5 1 2 5 4 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 3
19 A B 0 4 4 5 3 5 2 1 3 6 4 5 6 7 5 7 7 7 7 5 2
20 A B 0 7 6 6 6 6 6 1 2 4 6 6 7 6 4 6 6 7 7 6 4
21 A C 0 6 5 6 6 5 6 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
22 A B 0 6 5 7 7 7 7 6 5 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 2 3 2
23 A C 0 4 5 7 7 7 7 7 1 4 1 7 7 7 5 4 7 7 1 7 4
24 A B 0 6 5 7 5 6 6 3 5 6 5 6 7 7 5 3 5 3 5 3 2
25 A B 1 5 5 5 5 6 6 1 1 1 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 7 7 7
26 A B 1 7 7 7 7 5 7 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 5 7 7 1 1
27 A C 1 5 5 4 6 6 4 2 1 1 6 6 4 4 6 6 6 4 6 7 7
28 A C 1 6 6 6 5 6 6 2 2 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 5
29 A C 1 5 5 5 5 6 6 1 1 1 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 7 7 7
30 A C 1 3 3 6 5 4 3 5 5 5 3 6 4 6 3 3 3 6 3 3 3
31 A B 1 6 6 7 6 6 7 1 3 5 7 6 6 7 4 6 5 7 7 5 3
32 A C 1 6 6 6 5 6 5 2 4 3 5 6 7 6 5 5 4 6 6 4 5
33 A C 1 7 5 6 5 5 5 3 4 2 5 5 6 5 6 6 3 s 5 4 6
34 A C 1 6 6 6 6 6 5 2 3 2 4 7 7 6 6 6 4 5 6 5 6
35 A C 1 4 4 6 5 5 5 3 4 3 4 6 5 5 3 4 5 6 5 4 5
36 A C 1 4 1 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 4 5 6 7 4 7 1 1 1
37 A C 1 6 6 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 3 2 2
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Appendix D: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration–Combined 
 
Notes: 
Nature of Agency:  A – Established by Law or Executive Directive. 
Nature of Tenure:   A – Elected; B – Political Appointee; C – Career Civil Servant. 
Political Party Affiliation: 0 – Same Party Affiliation; 1 – Different Parties Affiliation. 
 
COMBINED
NATURE 
OF 
AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
TENURE
POLITICA
L  PARTY 
AFFILIATI
ON
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q7REV Q8REV Q9REV
1 A C 0 4 3.5 6 4 6 3.5 3 3 3 4 5 3.5 5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4 5 5 5
2 A C 0 6 3 6.5 6 5.5 6 5 2.5 5 3.5 6.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 4 6 6 3 5.5 3
3 A C 0 5.5 6 6 5.5 6.5 5.5 2 2 2 5 6 5.5 6 4.5 6 5.5 6.5 6 6 6
4 A C 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 1 1 7 7 7 4 6.5 6.5 7 7 4 7 7
5 A B 0 4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 3 1 1.5 5.5 6.5 6 6.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 5.5 5 7 6.5
6 A B 0 7 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7 1 1.5 2.5 7 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 7 7 6.5 5.5
7 A C 0 6 5.5 7 6 5.5 6 1.5 1.5 1.5 6.5 6.5 6 6 3.5 6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
8 A C 0 6 5.5 6 5 6.5 5 1.5 1.5 1.5 6 6 5.5 6 6.5 5.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
9 A B 0 6 4.5 4.5 6.5 5.5 5.5 1 1.5 2 6.5 6 5.5 6 4 6 6.5 5.5 7 6.5 6
10 A B 0 6 6 6 6 6 6.5 1 1 1 5.5 6.5 6 5.5 5 6 6 6.5 7 7 7
11 A B 0 5.5 5 6 5 5.5 5.5 2 1.5 1.5 2.5 6 5 6.5 5.5 4.5 5 7 6 6.5 6.5
12 A B 0 6.5 7 7 7 6.5 7 2 3 2.5 7 7 7 7 7 6.5 6.5 7 6 5 5.5
13 A B 0 5.5 5.5 6 5.5 6 5.5 4 4.5 4.5 6 5.5 5.5 6 6 6.5 6 7 4 3.5 3.5
14 A B 0 5.5 5 7 7 6.5 6.5 3 4 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5 5 5.5 6.5 6 5 4 2.5
15 A B 0 6 5.5 6 6.5 6 6.5 3.5 3.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 7 6 5.5 6 5.5 6 4.5 4.5 2.5
16 A C 0 6.5 6 7 6.5 7 6 3 3.5 5 6 7 6.5 7 4 6.5 6 3.5 5 4.5 3
17 A C 0 5.5 5.5 7 4.5 4 5.5 4.5 6.5 5 4.5 5.5 6.5 6 5 2 3.5 6.5 3.5 1.5 3
18 A C 0 6.5 6.5 5.5 6 5 5.5 1 1.5 3 5.5 6.5 6.5 7 5 7 7 7 7 6.5 5
19 A B 0 5 4 6 4 6 3.5 1 2 4 5 6 6 7 5 7 6 6.5 7 6 4
20 A B 0 7 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 1 1.5 2.5 6.5 6.5 7 6.5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7 6.5 5.5
21 A C 0 4.5 5 6.5 6 5.5 6 2 3.5 2 5 5.5 5.5 5 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 4.5 6
22 A B 0 5 5 7 6 6 7 3.5 3 3.5 7 7 7 7 3.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 4.5 5 4.5
23 A C 0 4.5 4.5 6 5.5 5 5.5 4 2 3 3 6 6 6.5 4 3.5 6 5.5 4 6 5
24 A B 0 5 4.5 7 4.5 6.5 6.5 2 3 3.5 5.5 6 5.5 7 3.5 5 6 5 6 5 4.5
25 A B 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 6 5.5 1 1 1 6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5 6 5.5 5.5 7 7 7
26 A B 1 7 7 6.5 7 6 7 1 4 4 6.5 7 7 7 6.5 5.5 5.5 7 7 4 4
27 A C 1 5 4.5 4 5 5.5 3 4 3 3 5.5 6 5 5 4.5 6 6 4.5 4 5 5
28 A C 1 6 6.5 6.5 6 6.5 6.5 1.5 1.5 2 6 5.5 5 6 4.5 6 6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6
29 A C 1 4 5.5 4.5 5 5.5 5 1 1.5 1.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4 3.5 6 6 5 7 6.5 6.5
30 A C 1 4 4 6.5 5 4.5 4 3 3 3 4.5 6 5 6.5 2 4 4 6.5 5 5 5
31 A B 1 6 5.5 6.5 6 6.5 6.5 1 2 4.5 6.5 6 6.5 4.5 2.5 5.5 5 7 7 6 3.5
32 A C 1 5.5 6 6 5.5 6 5.5 1.5 5 3 6 6.5 7 6.5 6 6 5.5 6.5 6.5 3 5
33 A C 1 6 5 6 5 4.5 5 3 2.5 1.5 5.5 6 6.5 6 6 6 4.5 3.5 5 5.5 6.5
34 A C 1 4 4 6.5 6.5 6.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 5 6.5 6.5 3.5 6.5 5.5 6 4.5 4.5 4
35 A C 1 5 5.5 6.5 5.5 6 6 2 2.5 3 5.5 6.5 5 6 4.5 5 5.5 6 6 5.5 5
36 A C 1 3.5 1.5 5.5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2.5 5 2.5 3 3.5 4 3.5 4.5 4 4 4
37 A C 1 6 5.5 7 6.5 6.5 6.5 3 4 4 6 7 6.5 7 6.5 6 5.5 6.5 5 4 4
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Appendix E: Collaboration Scores Grouped into the Five Dimensions 
 
Notes: 
Nature of Agency:  A – Established by Law or Executive Directive. 
Nature of Tenure:   A – Elected; B – Political Appointee; C – Career Civil Servant. 
Political Party Affiliation: 0 – Same Party Affiliation; 1 – Different Parties Affiliation. 
GOVERNANCE ADMINISTRATION AUTONOMY MUTUALITY NORM (TRUST) TOTAL
1 A C 0 3.75 4.88 5.00 4.20 4.00 4.41
2 A C 0 4.50 6.00 3.83 5.10 5.33 5.06
3 A C 0 5.75 5.88 6.00 5.40 6.00 5.76
4 A C 0 7.00 7.00 6.00 6.30 6.83 6.59
5 A B 0 4.75 5.25 6.17 6.00 5.83 5.68
6 A B 0 6.75 6.63 6.33 6.40 6.67 6.53
7 A C 0 5.75 6.13 6.50 5.70 6.33 6.06
8 A C 0 5.75 5.63 6.50 6.00 5.17 5.82
9 A B 0 5.25 5.50 6.50 5.60 6.00 5.76
10 A B 0 6.00 6.13 7.00 5.70 6.17 6.15
11 A B 0 5.25 5.50 6.33 5.10 5.50 5.50
12 A B 0 6.75 6.88 5.50 7.00 6.67 6.62
13 A B 0 5.50 5.75 3.67 5.80 6.50 5.50
14 A B 0 5.25 6.75 3.83 5.90 6.00 5.68
15 A B 0 5.75 6.25 3.83 6.30 5.83 5.71
16 A C 0 6.25 6.63 4.17 6.10 5.33 5.76
17 A C 0 5.50 5.25 2.67 5.50 4.00 4.68
18 A C 0 6.50 5.50 6.17 6.10 7.00 6.18
19 A B 0 4.50 4.88 5.67 5.80 6.50 5.53
20 A B 0 6.75 6.50 6.33 6.40 6.50 6.47
21 A C 0 4.75 6.00 5.50 5.10 5.50 5.41
22 A B 0 5.00 6.50 4.67 6.30 6.50 5.94
23 A C 0 4.50 5.50 5.00 5.10 5.00 5.09
24 A B 0 4.75 6.13 5.17 5.50 5.33 5.47
25 A B 1 4.50 5.38 7.00 5.50 5.67 5.65
26 A B 1 7.00 6.63 5.00 6.80 6.00 6.32
27 A C 1 4.75 4.38 4.67 5.20 5.50 4.91
28 A C 1 6.25 6.38 6.33 5.40 6.17 6.03
29 A C 1 4.75 5.00 6.67 4.20 5.67 5.15
30 A C 1 4.00 5.00 5.00 4.80 4.83 4.79
31 A B 1 5.75 6.38 5.50 5.20 5.83 5.71
32 A C 1 5.75 5.75 4.83 6.40 6.00 5.82
33 A C 1 5.50 5.13 5.67 6.00 4.67 5.44
34 A C 1 4.00 5.75 4.33 5.10 6.00 5.15
35 A C 1 5.25 6.00 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.59
36 A C 1 2.50 5.13 4.00 3.30 4.00 3.88
37 A C 1 5.75 6.63 4.33 6.60 6.00 6.00
DIMENSIONS OF COLLABORATION
AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
AGENCY
NATURE 
OF 
TENURE
POLITICAL  
PARTY 
AFFILIATION
